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VOTER DECEPTION

GILDA R. DANIELS·

ABSTRACT

In our recent electoral history, deceptive practices have been utilized
to suppress votes in an attempt to affect election results. In most major
elections, citizens endure warnings of arrest, deportation, and even
violence if they attempt to vote. In many instances, these warnings are
part of a larger scheme to suppress particular voters, whom I call
"unwanted voters," from exercising the franchise. Recent advancements
in technology provide additional opportunities for persons to deceive
voters, such as calls alerting citizens that Republicans (Whites) vote on
Tuesday and Democrats vote (Blacks) on Wednesday.
In spite ofthis resurgence ofdeception, the statutes that are available
for enforcement have in many instances remained dormant. Even worse,
they are sometimes used against the very community that they were
originally written to protect. This dormancy has revealed a need for
clarity. This article exposes the deficiencies in the current state of the
law governing voter intimidation and deceptive practices. Moreover, it
attempts to correct those deficiencies within the confines of the
Constitutional framework.
INTRODUCTION

Because [oj] the confusion caused by unexpected heavy voter
registration, voters are asked to apply to the following schedule:
Republican voters are asked to vote at your assigned location on
Tuesday.
Democratic voters are asked to vote at your assigned location on
Wednesday.
Thank you for your cooperation, and remember voting is a privilege.
-Franklin County, Where Government Works l

* Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank the
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(SEALS) New Scholars Workshop, and particularly Professor William Funk from Lewis & Clark
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Cassandra Jones Harvard, University of Baltimore School of Law; and Muriel Morisey, Temple
University Beasley School of Law, for their helpful comments. Special thanks to the Indiana Law
Review for their patience and hard work on this Article. Finally, I would like to thank my
wonderful research assistants, Bjorn Thorstensen and Anne Wilkinson.
1. NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR ELECTIONS, EXAMPLES OF DECEPTIVE FLYERS 2004, at
1, 3, available at http:!nccr.3cdn.netlf51celb593630cc86c_a7m6b9axu.pdf. In 2004, a flyer
containing this information was distributed in Franklin County, Ohio.
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In 2006, on Election Day in Prince George's County, Maryland, which is
predominately African American,2 voters arriving at the polls received a voting
guide announcing that prominent African Americans had endorsed the
Republican candidates, including an African American U.S. Senate candidate. 3
The voting guide falsely suggested4 that prominent Maryland Democrats were
endorsing Republican candidates in the hotly contested gubernatorial and U.S.
Senate election. 5 After the election, newly elected Senator Benjamin L. Cardin,
whom the African Americans had actually endorsed, testified before the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee regarding this false campaign literature and urged
the U.S. Attorney General to investigate. 6 The Department of Justice, however,
did not pursue the matter. Unfortunately, this is symptomatic of most claims
involving deceptive practices.
In the last half century, the U.S. Congress has journeyed into the world of

2. U.S. CENsusBVREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUIcKFACTS: PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD.
(2008), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstatesl24/24033.htInl.
3. NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR ELECTIONS.ORG, EXAMPLES OF DECEPTIVE FLYERS
2006, at 1, 1, available at http://1ccr.3cdn.netl58d2ee098f70fd887b_vom6bxgc8.pdf. The guide
was entitled "Ehrlich-Steele Democrats" and labeled an "Official Voter Guide." On the cover
were three prominent African American politicians: a former and the present county executive
and former congressman and President of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) Kweisi Mfume. Under their names read "[t]hese are OUR
choices." Id.; Prevention of Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation in Federal Elections:
Hearing on S. 453 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Congo (2007) (statement of Sen.
Cardin).
4. Laura Vozzella, Michael Steele's Sorry. So Sorry., BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 2009, at A2.
5. NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 3. These prominent African
Americans had endorsed candidate Ben Cardin for the U.S. Senate. See Matthew Hay Brown,
Senate Bill Outlaws Campaign Trickery; Cardin Backs Curb on Bogus Endorsements, BALT. SUN,
Feb. 1,2007, at B5. Additionally, the guide included a "Democratic Sample Ballot" that included
the correct date and times for the elections and endorsed Democratic candidates on all
levels-local, county, state, and federal. NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note
3, at 2. Yet, the guide neglected to endorse the Democratic candidates for governor and U.S.
Senate. Id. It endorsed the re-election of the Republican governor and the election of African
American Republican U.s. Senate candidate Michael Steele. Id. The guide included a notation that
Ehrlich and Steele campaigns had "Paid and Authorized" the publication and distribution of this
campaign literature. Id. Media accounts also attributed the Ehrlich and Steele campaigns to
knowingly distributing this false information. See, e.g., Paul Rogat Loeb, Editorial, 'Election
Fraud' Cry Useful Toolfor GOP, BALT. SUN, Mar. 18,2007, at A23 (alleging that the Steele
campaign bussed homeless men to hand out misleading flyers).
6. At the Senate hearing, Senator Cardin said that, "[t]his type of deceptive literature is
despicable and outrageous. It is clearly designed to mislead African-American voters about
prominent endorsements by well-respected politicians." Prevention of Deceptive Practices and
Voter Intimidation in Federal Elections: Hearing on S. 453 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
supra note 3 (statement of Sen. Cardin).
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election administration on three distinct and important occasions: the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),7 the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 (NVRA),8 and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).9 Despite recent
debates, new legislation, and the continued enforcement of various voting
statutes, problems persist in the operation of our participatory democracy.1O
Legislation has done little to forward the debate on the preeminence and
resurgence of voter intimidation and deceptive tactics. The most recent
legislation, NVRA and HAV A, dealt primarily with election administration
issues, such as voter registration and machinery. I I An overlooked area involving

7. The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). This Act, which has been heralded as
the most effective piece of congressional legislation in our nation's history, outlawed practices such
as literacy tests, empowered federal registrars to register citizens to vote, and gave the Attorney
General the power to bring widespread litigation instead of the piecemeal approach of the past. As
a result, wide disparities between Blacks and Whites in voter registration narrowed considerably
throughout the South and the number ofAfrican American elected officials increased tremendously.
See S. REp. 1)4-295, at II (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 777 (noting that the VRA
was "hailed by many to be the most effective civil rights legislation ever passed" in this country).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2006). The stated purpose of the NVRA is to increase voter
registration and participation. Id. The law also provides uniform standards for maintaining the list
of registered voters, conducting voter purges and provides additional safeguards under which
registered voters would be able to vote notwithstanding a change in address in certain
circumstances. Id. § 1973gg-3.
9. Help America Vote Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified
at 42 U.S.c. §§ 15301-15545 (2006)). The stated purpose ofHAVA is
to establish a program to provide funds to States to replace punch card voting systems,
to establish the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the administration of
Federal elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain
Federal election laws and programs, to establish minimum election administration
standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for the
administration of Federal elections, and for other purposes.
Id.
10. During the 2008 election, nonpartisan organizations chronicled numerous voting
irregularities in voter registration, felon disenfranchisement, long lines at the polls, poll watcher
challenges, unwarranted challenges to student voters, and deceptive practices. See, e.g., Hearing
on Lessons Leamedfrom the 2008 Election Before Subcomm. on Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties ofthe H. Comm. on the Judiciary, III th Congo I (2009) (statement ofTova Andrea
Wang, Vice President, Research, Common Cause); id. (statement of Hilary O. Shelton, Director,
Washington Bureau, NAACP); see also Protecting the Right to Vote: Oversight ofthe Department
of Justice's Preparations for the 2008 General Election: Hearing Before S. Judiciary Comm.,
Illth Congo I (2008) (statement of Gilda R. Daniels, Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore
School of Law).
II. "HAVA defined minimum election administration standards that all states must follow,
notably in the areas of voter identification and database management." Debra Milburg, Note, The
National Identification Debate: "Real ID" and Voter Identification, 3 liS: lL. & POL'y FOR INFO.
SOC'y 443,458 (2008); see also Bruce E. Cain, Election Administration: Still Broken After All
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voter access concerns the proliferation of deceptive acts and voter intimidation.
Each of these phenomena requires exemplification.
A person or group intentionally places an anonymous flyer in a mailbox,
leaves a voicemail message, distributes a campaign publication on Election Day,
or sends an email prior to early voting-all containing misleading and false
information. The information is often plausible: it could address the expected
massive turnout at an election and, thus, the need to extend voting to Tuesdays
for Republicans (Whites) and Wednesdays for Democrats (Blacks).12
Deceptive practices tend to target racial and language minorities and are a
throwback to the post-Reconstruction, Jim Crow-era tactics that sought to deny
minority citizens the right to freely participate in the electoral process. 13 Voter
intimidation became a primary and deadly issue after the Civil War and during
Reconstruction, 14 when newly freed slaves were systematically denied their right

These Years, 8 ELECTION L.J. 219 (2009) (reviewing VOTING IN AMERICA, VOL. 3, AMERICAN
VOTING SYSTEMS IN FLUX: DEBACLES, DANGERS, AND BRAVE NEW DESIGNS (Morgan E. Felchner
ed., 2008)); Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and Rebirth ofElection Administration, 6 ELECTION L.J.
118 (2007) (reviewing Roy G. SALTMAN, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF VOTING TECHNOLOGY:
IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY AND PUBUC CONFIDENCE (2006)).
12. See, e.g., NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 1. The now infamous
flyer from Franklin County, Ohio, pretended to come from the County Board of Elections urging
Republicans and Democrats to vote on different days; the Republican-designated day was the true
Election Day. Id Deceptive election flyers often falsely indicate the wrong date for an election.
Id.; see also infra note 32 (showing a flyer distributed prior to the November 4, 2008 federal
election falsely alerting voters that in an emergency General Assembly session the Virginia
legislature "adopted the following [sic] emergency regulations to ease the load on local electoral
[sic] precincts and ensure a fair electoral process" that Republicans would vote on Tuesday,
November 4, and Democrats on Wednesday, November 5; the flyer was distributed in the
predominately minority areas of Hampton Roads, VA). Additionally, at George Mason University
in Fairfax, Virginia, observers described "official-looking flyers" stating that due to the projection
of high voter turnout, Democrats should vote the day after the general election, November 5.
Thomas Frank & Richard Wolf, Pranks, Mischief Reach Higher Level at Colleges, USA TODAY,
Nov. 5,2008, at lOA (detailing bogus emails sent to students at George Mason University stating
that voting on campus had been moved back one day and discussing problems at other campuses
such as Ohio State and Florida State where students received text messages to the same effect, and
at Virginia Tech, where students received mass-emails via Facebook regarding bogus changes to
voting schedules); see also ELECTION PROTECTION 2008: HELPING VOTERS TODAY, MODERNIZING
TIIE SYSTEM FOR TOMORROW, PREliMINARY ANALYSIS OF VOTING IRREGULARITIES 12 (2008),
available at www.866ourvote.org!toolsldocumentslfilesl0077.pdf.
13. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN TIIE UNITED STATES 258-59 (2000) (describing tactics that segregationists used during the Jim
Crow era to "thwart" Black political participation, including literacy tests, grandfather clauses, poll
taxes, "understanding test[s)" purges and in some instances murder).
14. See, e.g., TRAcy CAMPBELL, DEliVER TIIE VOTE: A HISTORY OF ELECTION FRAUD, AN
AMERICAN POUTICAL TRADmON-1742-2004, at 46 (2005) (stating that in the mid-I800s violent
action meant to intimidate voters had reached disturbing levels); see also Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote
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to vote in Southern states through the use of violence and threatening tactics. 15
The South enacted measures, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and all-White
primaries that would limit the effect of the new and populous electorate. 16
Efforts to disenfranchise African American voters persisted after the Civil War
to counter the efforts of newly freed slaves effort to obtain equal access to the
ballot. 17 Indeed, during the Civil Rights Movement, the primary disenfranchising
and intimidating efforts were organized around registering voters and providing
access to the electoral process. In 1957, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., emphasized
the "conniving methods" that were used to prohibit Negroes from registering to
vote. IS Although historical accounts of voter intimidation are often full of death
threats and fear, today's intimidation and deception tend to exist in a less fatal
form, but continue to target minority communities. 19 Threats of incarceration or

Delayed Is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to Eliminating Election Administration
Legislation that Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U. LOUISVll.LE L. REv. 57 (2008).
15. RAYFORD W. LoGAN, THE BETRAVAL OF THE NEGRO: FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO
WOODROW WILSON 91 (Da Capo Press 1997) (1954). At the dawn of the twentieth century,
segregationists employed the country's most violent measures to ensure White political supremacy.
[d. In 1900, South Carolina Senator "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman, who led that state's push for
segregation, said, "[ w]e have done our level best, ... we have scratched our heads to find out how
we could eliminate the last one ofthem. We stuffed ballot boxes. We shot them .... We are not
ashamed of it." Id.
16. KEVSSAR, supra note 13, at 111-12.
In short order, other states followed suit, adopting-in varying combinations-poll
taxes, cumulative poll taxes . . . literacy tests, secret ballot laws, lengthy residence
requirements, elaborate registration systems, confusing multiple voting-box
arrangements, and eventually, Democratic primaries restricted to white voters. Criminal
exclusion laws also were altered to disfranchise men convicted of minor offenses, such
as vagrancy and bigamy.
[d.
17. See ERIKA WOOD, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, RESTORING THE RIGHT TO VOTE 7-8,
available at http://www.soros.orglinitiatives/usprograms/focus!justice/articles""publications!
publications!restoring_20080226IBrennan_RestoringVote_2008. pdf.
18. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., decried deceptive practices and intimidation in his Give Us
the Ballot speech. Dr. King stated: "[A]ll types of conniving methods are still being used to
prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters. The denial ofthis sacred right is a tragic betrayal
of the highest mandates of our democratic tradition." Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Give Us the
Ballot, Address at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom (May 17,1957), available at http://mlkkppO l.stanford.eduiprimarydocumentsNol4l17-May-1957_ GivesUsTheBallot.pdf.
19. See, e.g., NAT'L NETWORK FOR ELECTION REFORM, DECEPTIVE PRACTICES AND VOTER
INTIMIDATION I, available at http://www.nationalcarnpaignforfairelections.orglpagel-lDeceptive%
20Practices%20Networld'o20Issue%20Paper.pdf (describing deceptive and intimidating voting
practices in minority communities including the following: In 1998, in South Carolina, a state
representative mailed 3,000 brochures to African American neighborhoods, claiming that law
enforcement agents would be "working" the election, and waming voters that "this election is not
worth going to jail!!!!!!"). The African American community has been and continues to be a
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deportation instead of death often accompany voter intimidation and deception
efforts.20 For example, in 2006, in certain counties in Virginia with considerable
minority populations, voters received automated calls misinforming them that
they would be arrested if they tried to vote on Election Day and falsely reported
that their polling places had changed. 21 Consequently, conniving methods
continue to exist and adopt new forms.
In the 2008 federal election, the country also saw the proliferation of the use
of the Internet in both political campaigns22 and advancing political
misinformation. 23 The government's inability to prosecute offenders for printed
flyers or other traditional methods of conducting deceptive practices maximizes
the possibility of propagating misinformation via the Internet. 24 The resulting
blow to public confidence discourages citizens from participating in the electoral
process.
Voter deception involves, inter alia the distribution of misinformation
regarding the time, place, and manner of elections as well as voter eligibility.25

longstanding target of threatening tactics. Id.
20. See, e.g., id. In 2006, roughly 14,000 Democratic voters with Spanish surnames in
Orange County, California received letters before the November 7 election falsely warning that
immigrants could face jail time or deportation for vote. /d.
21. See LAWYERS COMMITfEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, INCIDENTS OF DECEPTNE
PRACTICES AND VOTER INTIMIDATION IN THE 2006 ELECTIONS, available at http://lccr.3cdn.
netld6af26cb3lfBee 166_vlm6x6x5.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Matthew Fraser & Soumitra Dutta, Obama and Facebook Effect: His Masterful
Use of Web Tools Helped Him Win the Presidency, MEDIAWEEK, Nov. 24, 2008, at 10, available
at 2008 WLNR 25922891; Joe Garofoli, Obama Eyes New Rolefor Internet, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
24,2008, at AI; Laura Olsen, Obama Team Capitalizes on Link to Youth, CHI. TRm., Nov. 26,
2008, at 7C.
23. See, e.g., Ben Conery, Electronic Scams Attempt to Keep New Voters at Home, WASH.
TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2008, at B02 (discussing voter-suppression tactics where the perpetrators utilized
text messages and Facebook and detailing Facebook messages that said election schedules had
changed or that various parties were supposed to vote on different days). The article also discusses
problems at Drexel University where students were told via flyers that they "would be arrested at
the polls if they had unpaid parking tickets." Id. Overall, however, according to the article,
incidents of voter suppression were far less prominent and on a much lesser scale than in past
elections. Id.; see also Common Cause, The Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and
the Century Foundation, Deceptive Practices 2.0: Legal and Policy Responses (on file with
author); Dan Morain, Some Obama Links Will Mislead, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 30,2008, at A18; JoyAnn Reid, Bogus Emails Raise Anxiety Over Voter ID Law, S. FLA. TIMEs, Oct. 3,2008, at AI.
24. The use of computers and other electronic mechanisms in the distribution of political
information has created yet another difficulty in thwarting these activities. Federal and state laws
are ill-equipped for Internet based deception. See infra Part I.A.2.
25. The prevalence ofdeceptive practices and misinformation in the political arena has raised
the profile of several websites dedicated to providing accurate information. See, e.g.,
FactCheck.org, http://www.factcheck.org/(lastvisited Oct. 7, 2009); PolitiFact.com, http://www.
politifact.comltruth-o-meter/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2009); Snopes.com; http://www.snopes.coml
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These deceptive practices regularly have as their main objective to misinform
unwanted minority, elderly, disabled, and language-minority voters26 in an effort
to suppress votes.27 Generally, the proliferation of misleading documents is
utilized to confuse and thwart eligible voters from participating in the electoral
process.
Many flyers are falsely disseminated in the name of an official governmental
agency.28 Additionally, the surge of computers, cell phones, and other
technology continues to hinder the identification of persons engaging in edeception. 29 Although these examples are a departure from heated campaign
battles, their reach is far and their impact discernible.
Efforts to deny voters the opportunity to participate in the electoral process
are not often investigated or litigated for myriad reasons, including the lack of
clear statutory authority and willingness to enforce. 3o Although the intent of
these practices is often clear and invidious, i.e., to suppress minority votes, it is
often difficult to know how many people are affected by voter intimidation or
deception. 31 The anonymous nature of deceptive flyers and electronic documents

politics/politics. asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2009) (containing a section on its website specifically
addressing political myths).
26. See Daniels, supra note 14, at 58 (defining unwanted voters as "the disabled, elderly,
poor, or minority voter").
27. See, e.g., Prevention ofDeceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 3 (statement of John Trasvifta, President and General
Counsel, Mexican Am. Legal Def. and Educ. Fund); Ian Urbina, Democrats Fear Disillusionment
in Black Voters, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27,2006, at AI, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2006/
10/27/us/politics/27race.html?pagewanted=all.
28. Prior to the 2008 federal election in Virginia, an anonymous flyer with the state seal,
distributed in minority areas in Hampton Roads, Virginia, indicated that Republicans would vote
on Tuesday and Democrats on Wednesday. Julian Walker, State Police Investigate Source of
Phony Election Flier, VA.-PILOT, Oct. 30, 2008, available at http://hamptonroads.coml2008/10/
state-police-investigate-source-phony-e1ection-flier. Police investigated the source of the flyer and
instead of filing charges decided that it was a "joke that got out of control." Id.; Julian Walker,
Officials Find Source of Fake Election Flier, Won't Press Charges, V A.-PILOT, Nov. 3, 2008,
available at http://hamptonroads.coml2008/11/ officials-find-source-fake-election-flier-wont-presscharges. Virginia is one of the few states that actually has a statute outlawing deceptive practices
in voting, classitying it as a Class 1 misdemeanor. See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1005.1 (2007).
29. Although convicted for an illegal voter suppression scam, Allen Raymond, author ofHow
to Rig an Election: ConfesSiOns of a Republican Operative (2008), stated in a National Journal
article that "[a]n e-mail is far more traceable than an anonymous flier." See, e.g., David Herbert,
Voter Suppression Hits the Web, NAT'L J. ONLINE, Oct. 29, 2008, www.nationaljournal.
comlnjonline/printjriendly.php?ID=no_20081027_9705.
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. People for the American Way Foundation, The Long Shadow of Jim Crow: Voter
Suppression in America 3-4 (2004), available at http://67.192.238.59/multimedia/pdf/Reports!
thelongshadowofjimcrow.pdf (noting that approximately four million Americans were denied the
right to vote in 2000 and included voter deception and intimidation as causes).
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makes it immensely difficult to detennine the source of pUblication and tends to
thwart investigations and prosecutions. 32 These practices, however, have
significant consequences for individual voters attempting to exercise their
fundamental right to vote. Moreover, these practices threaten the integrity and
legitimacy of the democratic process.
Despite this resurgence of suppression, the federal government has
underutilized its ability to litigate these types of cases. In fact, the Justice
Department said that it lacked the authority to pursue these cases, despite their
potential impact on the fundamental right to vote. 33 The federal government has
statutes at its disposal to prevent voter intimidation and deceptive practices. 34
But statutes penalizing voter intimidation are rarely used35 and have historically
been unsuccessful. 36
Legal scholars have addressed the effect of voter identification and voter
fraud on voter confidence and the integrity of the democratic system. 37 Law

32. See sources cited supra note 28.
33. Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 10.
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. For example, the Department of Justice has brought only four cases in the history of
Section 11(b) in the VRA's forty-five-year history. See infra Part I1.A.2.
36. See discussion infra Part I1.A.1-2.
37. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the
Beholder: The Role ofPublic Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121
lIARv. L. REv. 1737, 1750-51 (2008) (arguing the use of photo identification requirements bears
little correlation to the public's beliefs about the incidence of fraud); Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost ofthe
Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REv.
1023, 1066 (2009) (arguing that "the history of the right to vote has been a steady struggle between
those who wish to constrain or restrict the vote by raising the cost and those who wish to make the
vote more accessible by lowering the costs" and these costs must be factored into voting rights
jurisprudence to ensure free and accessible elections); Chad Flanders, How to Think About Voter
Fraud (and Why), 41 CREIGHTON L. REv. 93, 97 (2007) (proposing "that the right of participation,
though perhaps only denied to a few when new voter requirements are put in place, is the most
relevant (and serious) harm to analyze in the voter fraud debate"); Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely
Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2007); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105
MICH. L. REv. 631,631 (2007) (arguing that "policymakers should instead examine empirical data
to weigh the costs and benefits of [I.D.] requirement[s]" because "[e]xisting data suggest that the
number oflegitirnate voters who would fail to bring photo identification to the polls is several times
higher than the number of fraudulent voters, and that a photo-identification requirement would
produce political outcomes that are less reflective of the electorate as a whole"); Richard Tyler
Atkinson, Note, Underdeveloped and Overexposed: Rethinking Photo ID Voting Requirements,
Note, 33 J. LEGIS. 268, 269 (2007) (arguing "that photo ill requirements fail to fulfill their primary
purpose (the prevention of fraud); in fact, photo ill requirements decrease legitimate voter turnout
(and therefore may increase the impact of fraud"); Andrew N. DeLaney, Note, Appearance Matters:
Why the State Has an Interest in Preventing the Appearance of Voting Fraud, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv.
847 (2008) (arguing that the state has an interest not only in preventing voting fraud, but also in
preventing the appearance ofvoting fraud), and arguing the constitutionality ofphoto identification
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review articles have also discussed voter intimidation on the state and local
levels. 38 Most scholars and statutes conflate fraud with intimidation and
deceptive practices,39 without illuminating the nuances that make deceptive
practices an identifiable and worthy cause of action. The lack of a well-defined
statute coupled with poor enforcement and deficient deterrents necessitate a
reasoned view of ways to uphold the democratic principles of equal access to the

requirements in elections}; Samuel P. Langholz, Note, Fashioning a Constitutional VoterIdentification Requirement, 93 IOWAL. REv. 731,731 (2008)(examining "the results of these legal
challenges and suggest[ing] the parameters in which a state legislature can fashion a constitutional
voter-identification requirement"}; Aaron J. Lyttle, Note, Constitutional Law-Get the Balance
Right: The Supreme Court's Lopsided Balancing Test/or Evaluating State Voter-Identification
Laws; Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, /28 S. Ct. 1610 (2008), 9 WYo. L. REv. 281,
283 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme "Court adopted a lopsided balancing test, placing greater
emphasis on states' interests in preventing fraud than on the risk of burdening voting rights" and
"the Court's failure to weigh voters' interests against those of the state leaves the prior confusion
untouched, thus endangering voting rights"); Milburg, supra note II, at 466 (discussing "recent
developments and ongoing controversies concerning the REAL ID Act of2005" and "explores the
ramifications of a national identification card on the recent state trend of requiring identification
at the polls").
38. See, e.g., Anita S. Earls et ai., Voting Rights in North Carolina: 1982-2006, 17 S. CAL.
REv. L. & Soc. JUST. 577, 588 (2008) (discussing voting rights violations in North Carolina from
1982 to 2006 and summarizes the various barriers that minority voters in North Carolina voters still
face, including intimidation against minority voters and lack ofproper accommodations for disabled
voters); Patrick J. Troy, No Place to Call Home: A Current Perspective on Troubling
Disenfranchisement o/College Voters, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &POL'Y 591,616 (2006) (discussing voter
intimidation of college students and proposing solutions to that problem, such as locating polling
places on campus and creating a national standard for voter residency requirements); Katie Fowler,
Note, Deceptive Voting Practices and Voter Intimidation in the WakeofUnited States v. Charleston
County, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 733, 749 (2008) (tracing the presence vote dilution among minority
voters in at large elections in South Carolina before United States v. Charleston County, 316 F.
Supp. 2d 268 (D. S.C. 2003), and the impact that decision had on such voting systems}.
39. See, e.g., U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL REVIEW
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 13-14 (2006), http://www.eac.gov/
clearinghouseldocslreports-and-surveys-2006electioncrimes. pdf/attachment_download/file, which
defines election crimes, i.e., vote fraud, intimidation and deception as follows:
[I]ntentional acts or willful failures to act, prohibited by state or federal law, that are
designed to cause ineligible persons to participate in the election process; eligible
persons to be excluded from the election process; ineligible votes to be cast in an
election; eligible votes not to be cast or counted; or other interference with or
invalidation of election results. Election crimes generally fall into one of four
categories: acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and
failures or refusals to act.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added); see also Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded?
Highlighting an Inconsistent Consideration 0/ Election Fraud, 44 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. I, I
(2009) (defining election-related fraud into categories of "voter-initiated" and "voter-targeted").
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franchise.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment40 provides the
means for governments to exercise their authority to address voter deception. In
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,41 the Supreme Court found that
Indiana had a compelling interest in preventing fraud, in part because doing so
preserved public confidence and legitimate votes from dilution. 42 Likewise, the
Supreme Court has found that states possess a compelling interest in preventing
voter intimidation. 43 A comparable state interest applies to voter deception.
When the state or federal government has a compelling interest in protecting an
individual's right but fails to protect that right, the Constitution should not leave
it unguarded. 44 Although various federal and state statutes remain at the
government's disposal to combat deceptive practices, the Equal Protection
Clause should intervene to prevent states from outlawing vote dilution ensuing
from fraud while under-enforcing vote dilution ensuing from voter deception. A
similar result should occur when analyzing voter deception.
This Article exposes the deficiencies in the current state of the law governing
voter intimidation and deceptive practices. It attempts to correct the legal
deficiencies within the confines of the constitutional framework. This Article
provides a legal framework for voter intimidation and deception as well as
solutions to addressing the quagmire of federal laws that unfortunately do not
sufficiently deter these activities. It also presents a careful analysis of the
conceptual and legal issues concerning deceptive practices. Part I provides
contemporaneous examples of voter deception and illustrates the need for
comprehensive and strategic legal definitions for deceptive practices. Part II
discusses the gaps in existing statutes, the lack of enforcement of those statutes,
and the government's current focus on voter fraud and using statutes against
communities that are traditionally victims of deception. Part ill argues for a
Constitutional response under the Equal Protection Clause and recognizes First
Amendment and other Constitutional constraints. Part IV proposes a legislative
response that provides additional protections for individuals or groups victimized

40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
41. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
42. Id. at 184 (discussing the state's ability to impose burdens on voters through stricter voter
identification standards and finding the state's justification for requiring voter!D, preventing voter
fraud, compelling).
43. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,210 (1992) (finding that the state could place
constraints on electioneering near polling places on Election Day).
44. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims ojCognitive/y Impaired
Individuals, 38 MCGEORGE L. REv. 917, 930 (2007) (discussing the balance between the right to
vote of cognitively impaired individuals and the existing constitutional and legal framework that
governs each citizen's right to vote; arguing that the state must begin to balance disabled voters'
interest in participation within the electoral system and the broader public interest in maintaining
the integrity of the political system).
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by voter deception and offers a private right of action and improved criminal and
civil penalties to strengthen existing laws.
I. DEFINING DECEPTION

Elections in this new millennium have witnessed a revival of voter
intimidation and deceptive practices across the country.45 In every federal
election since the year 2000, suppressors have falsely instructed citizens under
the guise of governmental authority and in some instances using threats and
penalties to disseminate false information in predominately minority areas. 46 In
2004, the "Milwaukee Black Voters League," an organization that does not exist,
distributed a flyer warning people found guilty of any infraction, including traffic
tickets, to stay away from the polls or face possible imprisonment. 47 The flyer
read:
If you've already voted in any election this year, you can't vote in the
presidential election; If anybody in your family has ever been found
guilty of anything, you can't vote in the presidential election; If you
violate any of these laws, you can get ten years in prison and your
children will get taken away from yoU. 48
During the 2008 federal election, many states endured instances of intimidation
and deception targeting the minority community.49 These examples illustrate the
traditional deceptive practices of disseminating false information in minority
communities. 50
The 2008 presidential election cycle brought about a contested election in

45.
46.
47.
48.

See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
See NAT'L NETWORK FOR ELECTION REFORM, supra note 19, at 2.
Id.
Id.
49. ELECTION PROTECTION 2008, supra note 12, at 1. Since 2004, the Election Protection

campaign, which is comprised of approximately eighty organizations including the Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, People for the American Way Foundation Latino Justice,
and the NAACP have chronicled deceptive practices and voter intimidation taking place across the
country. !d.; see also NAT'L NETWORK FOR ELECTION REFORM, supra note 19, at 3 (describing a
2003 election in Philadelphia, where voters in African American areas were systematically
challenged by men carrying clipboards, driving a fleet of some 300 sedans with magnetic signs
designed to look like law enforcement insignia); Tim Shipman & Tom Leonard, Turnout Hits
Record as Fraud Claims Dog Polling Day, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LoNDON), Nov. 5, 2008, at 2
(providing a broad overview of reported Election Day problems in the United States relevant to
intimidation, suppression, and deception).
50. See Tova Andrea Wang, Election 2004: A Report Card, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1,2005,
http://www.reformelections.org/commentary.asp?opedid=824 (describing deceptive acts in Ohio
in 2004, where newly registered voters were falsely warned that if the NAACP, the John Kerry
Presidential campaign, America Coming Together, or a local congressional campaign registered
them to vote, that they were not eligible to vote).
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which citizens were bombarded with robo calls 51 and misleading flyers. 52 The
nature of these calls was similar to traditional deceptive flyers in that they
contained false information and were generally targeted at both minority and
Democratic voters, but involved less cost and more impact. 53
Suppressors also used electronic deception to intimidate and deceive voters.
In Texas, an Internet message instructed voters to cast a straight Democratic
ticket and separately punch Barack Obama's name, which would negate their
vote. 54 Accordingly, e-deception provides yet another concern. Indeed, emails
touting the ineligibility of voters because of foreclosures were prevalent and
caused at least one Attorney General to try to provide accurate information. 55
Although the Maryland Attorney General and others utilized the media in an
attempt to correct the misinformation, in most instances, these types of accounts
remain unparsed and unprosecuted.

A. A Deceptive Definition
Deception is defined as "the practice of deliberately making somebody
believe things that are not true; an act, trick, or device intended to deceive or
mislead somebody.,,56 When the act of deception partners with the act of voting,

51. See, e.g., Jennifer Duck, Dems Claim GOP Launched 'Dirty' Phone Campaign, ABC
NEWS, Nov. 6,2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2633458&page=l; Sam
Stein, Wave ofMcCain Robocalls Reported, Some May Violate State Law, HUFFINGTONPOST, Oct.
16,2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com!20081l0/16/massive-mc-robocall-may_n_135348.html.
Robo calls are a fairly new technological advance that allow an individual or group to make
multiple phone calls to promote a political message and can be used to disseminate misleading
information to masses in an effort to sway voters. See Charles Babington & Alec MacGillis, It's
a Candidate Calling. Again: Republicans Deny Subterfuge as Phone Barrages Anger Voters,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2006, at A8.
52. Susan Q. Stranahan, Broken Elections, Stolen Votes-Part V, CENTER FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY, July 7, 2008, http://www.buyingofthepresident.orglindex.php/storieslbroken_
elections_stolen_votesyart_five/.
53. In Missouri in 2006, the Secretary of State reported that citizens had received robo calls
informing them that their polling places had changed when they had not and warning voters to bring
voter ID or they would not be permitted to vote. See OFF. OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTERS
FIRST: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 2006 MIDTERM ELECTION IN MISSOURJ 17 (2007), http://www.
sos.mo.gov/electionsNotersFirstl2006NoterFirst-Complete.pdf.
54. See Herbert, supra note 29 (arguing that voters are being suppressed through
communications on the Web this campaign season by capitalizing on new technologies and taking
advantage of an electorate that increasingly consumes political news online).
55. See MD. OFF. OF THE ATT'y GEN., REpORT ON THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE
ON VOTING IRREGULARITIES (2008), http://www.oag.state.md.usiReports/Voting..1020Task..1020Force
%20Repor4_ 28.pdf.
56. ENCARTA WORW ENGUSH DICTIONARY (N. Am. Ed. 2009), available at http://encarta.
msn.com!encnetifeatures/dictionarylDictionaryResults.aspx?texttype=3&search=deception
(containing a basic definition for the act of deception).
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the jurisprudence leaves open whether the practice of deliberately misleading a
voter serves as a legally actionable deed. 57 Consequently, voter deception is the
act of knowingly deceiving voters regarding the time, place, or manner of
conducting elections or the qualifications for or restrictions on voter eligibility.
In considering deceptive deeds, one must also consider their relation to fraud
and intimidation, particularly because those areas have far more protections than
deceptive practices and include some similarities. Voter deception is, in many
ways, similar to voter fraud and voter intimidation, yet some distinctions exist.
Scholars have sought to define vote fraud,58 and statutes exist for determining
voter intimidation. 59 Few have attempted to conquer the amorphous and arguably
ambiguous definition of voter deception. 60
In an effort to encompass all illegal election activity, the Election Assistance
Commission (EAC)61 created a definition of "election crimes.,,62 The definition,
however, is overbroad and only tangentially includes deceptive acts.63 In the
EAC's broad definition, only the terms "intentional acts ... designed to cause.
. . eligible votes not to be cast or counted" tangentially address deceptive
practices. 64 Indeed, it speaks more to intimidation or fraud than deception. The

57. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
58. See, e.g., Ansolabehere & Persily, supra note 37, at 1758-59 (analyzing through
surveying the impact of voter fraud and its relation to participation in the political process and
finding that the use of photo identification requirements bears little correlation to the public's
opinion about the incidence of fraud); Flanders, supra note 37, at 95 (framing the debate as the
seriousness of voter fraud versus the deterrence of voters in passing laws to deter this activity such
as photo identification requirements at the polls).
59. See infra Part II.A.1.
60. See e.g., Overton, supra note 37, at 636 (arguing the need for empirical data and less
anecdotes in imposing voter ill laws).
61. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N R., supra note 39.
62. See Job Serebrov & Tova Wang, Voting Fraud and Voter Intimidation Report to the u.s.
Election Assistance Commission on Preliminary Research & Recommendations, 6 ELECTION LJ.
330,332 (2007) (defining "election fraud" as "any intentional action, or intentional failure to act
when there is a duty to do so, that corrupts the election process in a manner that can impact on
election outcomes"); Tova Andrea Wang, A Rigged Report on U.S. Voting, WASH. POST, Aug. 30,
2007, at A2l.
63. The EAC tasked Job Serebrow and Tova Wang to provide a report on the prevalence of
voter fraud and voter intimidation. See Serebrov & Wang, supra note 62, at 331. The final report
was met with some criticism. See Wang, supra note 62. In the report, however, the EAC broadly
defines election crimes. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
64. A 2007 EAC report defined election crimes, which would include voter fraud and voter
intimidation, but not voter deception as
any intentional action, or intentional failure to act when there is a duty to do so, that
corrupts the election process in a manner that can impact on election outcomes. This
includes interfering in the process by which persons register to vote; the way in which
ballots are obtained, marked, or tabulated, and the process by which election results are
canvassed and certified.
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EAC definition serves as a medley of actions that allow voter deception to remain
ignored as a serious offense to the democratic process.
In 2007, then-newly elected Senator Barack Obama and senior statesman
Senator Charles Schumer unsuccessfully attempted to fill this void. In the 11 Oth
Congress, Senators Obama and Schumer introduced the Deceptive Practices and
Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of2007, which would criminalize many ofthe
tactics of voter deception and increase the penalty from one to five years for
anyone convicted of voter intimidation. 65 The bill prohibits a person from
deceiving a voter regarding the time, place, or manner of the election. 66 Further,
it requires the Attorney General to provide "accurate" election infonnation when
deception allegations are proven and to report to Congress on allegations of
deception after each federal election. 67 Because this bill speaks to voter
deception, it specifically reinforces the need for stricter penalties and greater
clarification. In some instances, however, it tends to fall short of its goal.
1. Deception as Fraud.-Generally, voter fraud involves "obtaining and
marking ballots, the counting and certification of election results, or the
registration of voters. ,,68 Traditional forms of voter fraud involve voting multiple
times under false names, vote buying, and election officials committing fraud
through counting spoiled ballots. 69 Intimidation and deceptive practices,
however, do not fall squarely within the definition of voter fraud. One scholar
suggests that courts should evaluate voter fraud in two separate categories:
"voter-initiated" and "voter-targeted.,,70 Although voter-initiated acts refer
generally to voter fraud and voter-targeted to what is generally considered voter
suppression, the joining of these acts tends to negate the deceptive practices for

Serebrov & Wang, supra note 62, at 332. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N R., supra note
39, at 14.
65. Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Act of2007, S. 453, I 10th Congo § 3 (2007).
66. Id. The Act also designates the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department as the
federal agency responsible for correcting misinformation that comes to its attention and to provide
Congress with a report of any deceptive practices allegation within ninety days of any election for
federal office, including primaries, and run-otIs. S. 453, § 4.
67. The Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of2007 has remained
dormant in the Senate. A House version of the bill, H.R. 12SI, passed June 25, 2007 out of the
House. A 2005 version of the bill in the House would have provided a private right of action for
deceptive practices under 42 U.S.c. § 1971(c) (2006) and provides criminal penalties. Deceptive
Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of2005, H.R. 4463, I 09th Congo § 2(a)(2) (2005);
see infra Part IV.A.
6S. CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY L. SIMMONS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION
OFFENSES 3 (U.S. Dep't of Just., Crim. Division, Pub. Integrity Sect., 7th ed. 200S), available at
www.justice.gov/criminaVpinldocsielectbook-rvsOS07.pdf.
69. LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POUTICS OF VOTER FRAUD 6 (2007), available at
http://www.bradblog.com/Docslpoliticsofvoterfraudfinal.pdf.
70. See Benson, supra note 39, at I (arguing that courts should consider the initiators of the
fraud who commits the acts and the effects on our democracy).
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the more politically feasible voter fraud. 7) The level of voter fraud has long been
debated and serves as an impetus for recent legislation meant to deter alleged
fraudulent activity.72
The Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice (PIN), which is
primarily responsible for pursuing vote fraud cases, defines "election fraud" as
"involv[ing] a substantive irregularity relating to the voting act-such as bribery,
intimidation, or forgery-which has the potential to taint the election itself.,,73
PIN acknowledges that some acts that may arguably constitute fraud may
nonetheless not be recognized as a federal election crime. 74 It specifically points
to instances of "distributing inaccurate campaign literature" as an example of
"reprehensible" actions that generally fall outside the scope of federal statutes. 75
Thus, the example of Prince George's County, discussed earlier, although
reprehensible and arguably involving deception, would not fall within a
prosecutable form of election fraud and, as such, would not be pursued or
prosecuted. 76
Both voter fraud and voter deception are types of electoral interference that
seek to affect electoral outcomes. Both fraud and deception involve untruths;
deception involves limiting the number of voters; and voter fraud attempts to
increase those numbers falsely. Scholars have debated the wisdom of election
laws passed to address voter fraud,?7 but the need for stronger and more potent
voter suppression and, in particular, voter deception laws is left wanting.
Consequently, voter fraud and voter deception enjoy different outcomes and
should require different legislative strategies, definitions, and penalties. 78

71. Id. State legislatures have focused much of their attention on combating voter fraud
through the implementation of various voter identification laws. MlNNITE, supra note 69, at 61.
The voter identification debate has been characterized as a strictly partisan fight. Id. at 3. States
that passed voter identification laws were Republican-controlled. Id. at 6. Most Democraticcontrolled governments rejected voter identification legislation that made it more difficult for
citizens to cast a ballot. Id.; see id. at 5 (finding that "[t]he claim that voter fraud threatens the
integrity of American elections is itself a fraud").
72. LoRI MINNITE & DAVID CALLAHAN, SECURlNG THE VOTE: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTION
FRAUD 13-17 (2003) (discussing the lack of relationship between election fraud and requiring photo
identification); cf JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: How VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR
DEMOCRACY (2004) (discussing recent examples of electoral tampering through voter fraud).
73. See DONSANTO & SIMMONS, supra note 68, at 24.
74. See id. at 47.

75. Id.
76. See discussion supra Part I.A.
77. See, e.g., Overton, supra note 37, at 681 (concluding that voting identification
requirements may prevent fraud but also prevent legitimate voters from casting a ballot).
78. A. David Pardo, Election Law ViolatiOns, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 305, 308, 329 (2008)
(discussing election fraud statutes, voter intimidation, and campaign finance and provides
alternative theories of prosecution, such as the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006). used to
prosecute interstate travelers); see also Benson, supra note 39, at 1 (discussing how courts should
adjudicate "voter-initiated" and "voter-targeted" fraud differently).
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2. Deception as Intimidation.-Voter intimidation involves threats, force,
or interference in the balloting process in a manner that intimidates the voter
from participating in the election process. 79 Federal statutes define intimidation
as those actions that involve threats and interfere with a voter's right to exercise
the franchise. 80 Threats of prosecution and deportation for committing the act of
voting illustrate the types of intimidating acts that currently encompass voter
intimidation. 81
The main distinction between voter intimidation and voter deception is that
intimidation of voters carries with it a connotation of some type of threat, e.g.,
incarceration or deportation. 82 Although the two areas overlap (and may, in fact,
be considered synonymous in many cases), deception is more focused on
misinformation or purposely disseminating misinformation,83 while intimidation
is characterized by more threatening actions. This distinction, however, could
allow a broad definition of voter suppression because the nature of the actions
seeks to dissuade voters from participating in the electoral process. The efforts
to thwart voter participation through deception and intimidation are similar and
fit more securely in an analysis of overall attempts at suppression rather than
fraud. Although voter intimidation and deception are similar and statutes exist
specifically for intimidation and fraud, no federal legislation directly addresses
deception.
B. Voter Suppression
Voter intimidation and deceptive practices fall generally within voter

79. Wendy Weiser & Margaret Chen, Voter Suppression Incidents 2008, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUST., Nov. 3, 2008, http://www.brennancenter.orglcontentlresource/voter_suppression_
incidents (last visited Oct. 8,2009). The Brennan Center compiled a list of Voter Intimidation and
Deceptive Practices that occurred across the country in the 2008 federal election, many included
actions from "officials" intimidating voters. Id. For example, in New Mexico a private investigator
responding to an allegation from Republican Party operatives questioned voter's eligibility to vote
in a June primary. Id. The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund sued on behalf
of the investigated citizens who were deemed eligible voters. Id. Other federal and state statutes
that define voter intimidation are discussed infra Part H.B.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (2006).
81. See NAT'L NETWORK FOR ELECTION REFORM, supra note 19, at 2.
82. See DoNSANTO & SIMMONS, supra note 68, at 53.
83. Press Release, Sen. Barack Obama, Obarna Bill Would Make Election Fraud, Voter
Intimidation Illegal (June 7, 2007), available at http://sweetness-Iight.comlarchivellegislation-youget-from-an-acom-organizer. The unsuccessful Obarna bill, co-sponsored by New York Sen.
Charles Schumer, linked deceptive practices and intimidation, defining "deceptive practices" as
"involv[ing] the dissemination offalse information intended to prevent voters from casting their
ballots, intimidate the electorate, and undermine the integrity of the electoral process." Deceptive
Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of2007, S. 453, II Oth Congo § 2 (2007) (emphasis
added).
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suppression,84 which seeks to decrease the number of eligible voters and,
generally, take the electoral power away from individuals or groups; it also often
uses deception or threats to accomplish this goal. PIN admits that no federal
statute currently exists that criminalizes voter suppression. 85
The nature of voter suppression and the ability to document examples of
voter deception reinforce the need to prohibit the act of diluting the votes of
eligible voters under the Equal Protection Clause. Although voter intimidation
and deception are similar and statutes exist specifically for intimidation and
fraud, no federal legislation directly addresses deception. 86 Although
documented occasions of voter deception exist, few instances exist in the voter
fraud context. In fact, the Court noted in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Boarcjl1 that Indiana had no history of in-person voter fraud. 88 Yet, it passed
legislation arguing that it was compelled to provide protections for its citizens
against actions that it perceived as a threat to the democratic process. 89 The
same, however, is true in the voter deception area and examples of deception are
plentiful yet receive less attention. 90

II.

DECEPTIVE LAWS

91

The Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the denial of
the right to vote on the basis of "race, color or previous condition of servitude."
Other amendments prohibit discrimination based on sex92 and age. 93 A post-Civil

84. PIN defines voter suppression as follows:
Voter suppression schemes are designed to ensure the election of a favored candidate
by blocking or impeding voters believed to oppose that candidate from getting to the
polls to cast their ballots. Examples include providing false information to the
public--or a particular segment of the public-regarding the qualifications to vote, the
consequences of voting in connection with citizenship status, the dates or qualifications
for absentee voting, the date of an election, the hours for voting, or the correct voting
precinct. Another voter suppression scheme, attempted recently with partial success,
involved impeding access to voting by jamming the telephone lines of entities offering
rides to the polls in order to prevent voters from requesting needed transportation.
DONSANTO & SIMMONS, supra note 68, at 61.
85. Id.
86. See supra Part II.
87. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
88. Id. at 1617-18.
89. Id.atI619.
90. See infra Part II.B.
•
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§1, 2. The Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
states: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1. The Nineteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
states: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
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War statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241, sought to address efforts to deprive Blacks of their
Constitutional rights, including the right to vote. 94 Despite this early effort to
address intrusions in the right to vote, and later iterations that followed,95 the
need to combat efforts to thwart participation through voter intimidation and
deception remains.
It was not until 1939 that Congress specifically sought to penalize
intimidating acts that could deny eligible citizens the right to vote with the
passage of the Hatch Act. In addition to addressing the appropriate level of
political activity for federal employees, the law also made it illegal to intimidate
voters in federal elections. 96 Prior to the passage of the VRA, prosecutors
utilized 42 U.s.C. § 1971(b) to counter voter-intimidation. 97 In many instances,
prosecutors were thwarted by the statutes requirement proof of "purposeful

United States or by any State on account of sex." [d.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. The Twenty-sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
provides that persons who are eighteen or older are eligible to vote. [d.
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006). This statute provides in part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person.
· . in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same
· .. [t]hey shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both
This includes protections for the rightto vote. See Wilkins v. United States, 376 F.2d 552, 554 (5th
Cir. 1967).
95. See infra Parts II.A-B.
96. See, e.g., S. REp. No. I, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 12,25,39 (l939); 84 CONGo REc. 9604
(1939). The portion of the Hatch Act that addresses voter intimidation is codified at 18 U.S.C. §
594 (2006) and states in part:
[S]uch other person to vote or to vote as he may choose, or of causing such other person
to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice President,
Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives .
· . at any election held solely or in part for the purpose of electing such candidate, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
[d.
97. The case law indicates that several pre-VRA cases were successful. See, e.g., United
States V. Beaty, 288 F.2d 653, 655-56 (6th Cir. 1961) (finding relief against economic coercion,
involved eviction of black sharecroppers); United States V. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 781 (5th Cir.
1961) (granting relief against state prosecution of a black engaged in voter-registration work);
United States V. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720, 828 (S.D. Ala. 1965) (granting relief against baseless
arrests and ~justified prosecutions). Others may have been thwarted by the inability to prove
purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., United States V. Bd. ofEduc. of Greene County, Miss., 332
F .2d 40, 46 (5th Cir. 1964) (affirming a decision involving a school board's refusal to rehire a black
teacher who took part in voterregistration activities); United States V. Edwards, 333 F.2d 575, 57879 (5th Cir. 1964) (affirming a trial court's decision involving a physical attack on blacks who
sought to register to vote).
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discrimination.,,98 Congress's passage of the VRA,99 and in particular Section
11 (b) of that legislation, made it clear that the government was not required to
prove that the acts were purposefully discriminatory. Since the passage of
Section 11 (b), however, the federal government has rarely used this provision to
pursue voter intimidation and attempts to use it as a means to prevent and deter
voter intimidation have been largely unsuccessful.

A. Dormant Federal Statutes
In analyzing existing federal statutes and enforcement, neither clear
definition nor authority exists for prosecuting the act of voter deception. In some
instances, well-respected governmental authorities have said that the federal
government lacks the authority to pursue deceptive practices. 1oo Ambiguities
remain in the federal law context regarding deceptive practices. 101 The justified
focus on the twentieth-century issue of voter intimidation to allow access, and the
twenty-first century focus on vote fraud in some instances to deny access,
necessitates congressional and state legislative attention.
Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (b) and Section 11(b)ofthe VRA, as well as the

98. During the House Hearings on passage of the VRA, then-Attorney General Katzenbach
said: "There has been case after case of similar intimidation-beatings, arrests, lost jobs, lost credit,
and other forms of pressure against Negroes who attempt to take the revolutionary step of
registering to vote." Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the Subcomm. No.5 ofthe H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Congo 9 (1965) (statement of Att'y Gen. Nicholas Katzenbach).
Attorney General Katzenbach also said that
[p]erhaps the most serious inadequacy [of the existing statutes prohibiting voter
intimidation] results from the practice of district courts to require the Government to
carry a very onerous burden of proof of "purpose." Since many types of intimidation,
particularly economic intimidation, involve subtle forms of pressure, this treatment of
the purpose requirement has rendered the statute largely ineffective.
Id. at 11.
99. President Lyndon B. Johnson called the VRA ofl965, "one ofthe most monumental laws
in the entire history of American freedom." DAVID 1. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., AND TIfE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 132 (1978) (citing PUBLIC PAPERS OF
TIfE PRESIDENTS, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, 1965, at 840-43); see also Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,
96 Stat. 131 (1982); Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of2006, Pub. L. No.
109-246 (2006); see generally Nw. Austin Muo. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d
221 (D.D.C. 2008),prob.juris. noted, 129 S. Ct. 894 (mem.), rev'dandremanded, 129 S. Ct. 2504
(2009).
100. See CRAIG DONSANTO, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OFELEcnON OFFENSES 749, 795 (7thed.,
1689 PLIICorp. 2008) (stating although some acts are "reprehensible" they are beyond the reach
of federal statutes, such as "distributing inaccurate campaign literature").
101. For a discussion of election law statutes, see, for example, Pardo, supra note 78; David
C. Rothschild & Benjamin 1. Wolinsky, Election Law Violations, 46 AM. CRlM. L. REv. 391 (2009).
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NVRA, statutes that the u.s. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
enforces, do not contain criminal penalties. 102 A major shortcoming lies in the
lack of criminal penalties.
1. Federal Criminal Penalties and Enforcement.-The federal criminal
statute falls far short of enforcement and meaningful penalties for voter
intimidation and deception. PIN enforces criminal use of threats or violence to
coerce voters in voter registration, voting or uses voter registration applications
in a fraudulent manner. 103 However, PIN has not prosecuted persons for
misleading or false information under this statute. 104
PIN believes that a plausible vehicle for broad acts of voter suppression and
more specific acts of intimidation prosecutions is 18 U.S.C. § 241, which
considers it a felony to "conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
person in any State, Territory, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured to him the Constitution or laws of the United States. ,,105
In United States v. Tobin,106 the federal government charged a Republican
Party official with jamming phone lines in an effort to affect the hotly contested
2002 U.S. Senate election in New Hampshire. 107 The court found that 18 U.S.C.
§ 241 was applicable and imprisoned the official for three months. 108 This
statute, however, has been rarely used in the voting context and only with varying

102. Section 1971(c) authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil actions for "preventive
relief' against violations of§ 1971(b). 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c)(2006). Section 11 (b) of the VRA does
not include criminal penalties. Id. § I 973i(b).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006).
104. Most recently, PIN prosecuted a Republican operative in a voter suppression scam in New
Hampshire using 18 U.S.C. § 241. United States v. Tobin, No. 04-CR-216-01-SM, 2005 WL
3199672 at *1, *3 (D.N.H. Nov. 30, 2005)(holding that a conspiracy to interfere with a person's
right to vote violates 18 U.S.C. § 241).
lOS. 18 U.S.C. § 241. The Supreme Court has found that voting is a fundamental right. See
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964) (holding that apportionment of congressional districts so
that single congressman represented from two to three times as many Fifth District voters as were
represented by each of congressmen from other Georgia districts grossly discriminated against
voters in Fifth District in violation of the constitutional requirement that representatives be chosen
by people of the several states); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("[T]he right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.... any alleged infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.").
106. 2005 WL 3199672, at *1, *3 (holding that a conspiracy to interfere with a person's right
to vote violates § 241).
107. Thomas B. Edsall, GOP Official Faces Sentence in Phone-Jamming, WASH. POST, May
17,2006, at AIO. One of the Republican Party's top priorities in 2002 was to retain the New
Hampshire Senate seat. Id. Tobin, the Republican National Committee regional political director,
was "[o]vercome by his desire for success in the election," he used his position to make the phone
jamming scheme successful instead of stopping it. Id.
108. ALLENRAYMOND,HOWTORIGANELECfION: CONFESSIONSOFAREpUBUCANOPERATIVE
236 (2008). The defendant, Allen Raymond chronicled his actions in a book. Id. at I.
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degrees of success. 109 Nonetheless, PIN believes that voter suppression
infractions should be prosecuted and that 18 U.s.C. § 241 is the proper
mechanism until Congress passes a statute that is more directly on point. I 10 This
focus, however, continues to ignore the act of voter deception as a prosecutable
offense and threat to the democratic process.
Although a civil statute, the NVRA's provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-10(1),
prohibits the fraudulent and intimidating acts surrounding the voter registration
process and includes imprisonment and monetary fines as punishment. I II But it
does not include penalties for deceptive practices, such as anonymous leaflets
that indicate the wrong date for the election.
2. Federal Civil Penalties and Enforcement.-In the civil law context, two
federal statutes currently govern voter intimidation: 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (b) 112 and

109. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1941) (interpreting § 20 to apply to
the deprivation of the constitutional rights of qualified voters to choose representatives in
Congress).
110. See DONSANTO & SIMMONS, supra note 68, at 63 (arguing that "suppression schemes
[represent] an important law enforcement priority, that such schemes should be aggressively
investigated, and that, until Congress enacts a statute specifically criminalizing this type of conduct,
18 U.S.C. § 241 is the appropriate prosecutive tool by which to charge provable offenses.").
Ill. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-IO(I) provides:
A person, including an election official, who in any election for Federal office(I) knowingly and willfully intimidates, threatens, or coerces, or attempts to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce, any person for(A) registering to vote, or voting, or attempting to register or vote;
(B) urging or aiding any person to register to vote, to vote, or to attempt to register or
vote; or
(C) exercising any right under this subchapter; or
(2) knowingly and willfully deprives, defrauds, or attempts to deprive or defraud the
residents of a State of a fair and impartially conducted election process, by(A) the procurement or submission of voter registration applications that are known by
the person to be materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent under the laws of the State in
which the election is held; or
(B) the procurement, casting, or tabulation of ballots that are known by the person to be
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent under the laws of the State in which the election
is held, shall be fined in accordance with title 18 (which fines shall be paid into the
general fund of the Treasury, miscellaneous receipts (pursuant to section 3302 of title
31), notwithstanding any other law), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
42 U.S.C. § I 973gg-lO(a) (2006).
112. The bill that preceded these statutes and governed intimidation was the Hatch Act of
1939, which dealt with political activities offederal employees and also prohibited intimidation of
voters in federal elections. DONSANTO & SIMMONS, supra note 68, at 57. The intimidation
provision was a response to irregularities in the 1938 election, including economic pressure on
participants in Works Progress Administration programs. Hatch Act of 1939: Information, at
http://www.answers.comltopiclhatch-act-of-1939 (last visited Mar. 14,2010). 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (b)
(2006) reads as follows:
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Section 11 (b) of the VRA.113 These statutes give the government the ability to
deter voter intimidation. The statutes' language gives prosecutors the potential
to litigate against persons who interfere with the right to vote. But they have
remained underutilized and leaves the purpose of the statutes unfulfilled and
open to political interpretation.
In its present form, the VRA prohibits voter intimidation, but it does not
include criminal penalties for such acts. I 14 Moreover, other issues, such as giving
false information or voting more than once, are criminalized in § 1973i(c )-(e) and
other violations under § 1973. 115 Although § 1971(b) prohibits interfering with
a constitutional right such as attempting to vote, it has been much more
successful at other times, particularly in the Civil Rights era. 116 Conversely,
Section 11 (b) is rarely used and has remained highly unsuccessful. 117 The
Department of Justice has brought only four lawsuits under Section 11 (b) in the

No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten,
coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of
interfering with the right of such other person to vote or to vote as he may choose, or
of causing such other person to vote for, or not to vote for, any candidate for the office
of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of
the House of Representatives, Delegates or Commissioners from the Territories or
possessions, at any general, special, or primary election held solely or in part for the
purpose of selecting or electing any such candidate.
42 U.S.C. § 1971 (b )(2006). Section 1971 (c) authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil actions
for "preventive relief' against violations of § 1971(b).
113. Section 11(b) of the VRA reads as follows:
No person, whether acting under color oflaw or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten,
or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for voting or
attempting to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten,
or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or
intimidate ....
42 U.S.C. § 1973i.
114. [d.
115. See id.
116. Early suits under § 1971 (b) sought injunctive relief against persons who used economic
and physical threats against eligible voters. For example, in United States v. Original Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 349-50 (E.D. La. 1965), the three-judge district court panel
held that the defendants violated § 1971 (b). The defendants admitted that they had engaged in
economic coercion and other efforts to prevent blacks in Washington Parish from registering to
vote. Id. at 337. The court rejected the defendants' contentions that § 1971(b) does not apply to
private individuals and that the statute is unconstitutional. [d. at 349,355. See also United States
v. Chappell (sought and obtained injunctive relief against segregated voter lists); Bell v. Home
(M.D. Ga. 1965) (sought and obtained injunctive relief against acts of intimidation, including the
arrest of blacks who had refused to leave a "white" polling place).
117. See Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions ofthe Voting Rights Act
Are Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y. U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 69, 117 n.290
(2003) (noting that section II(b) prohibits intimidation by individuals but not by jurisdictions).
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history of the VRA. IIS All were brought for various violations that are
contemporaneously classified as voter suppression; most are pure voter
intimidation cases and only one could arguably classify as a voter deception
case. 119
The more contemporary Section 11 (b) cases are informative in ascertaining
the Department's philosophy towards prosecuting under the statute, which the
courts have interpreted as a voter intimidation statute because of its prohibition
against threats. 120 The most recent cases involve the Department of Justice filing
complaints against racial minorities. 121 The choice of enforcement is revealing
about the impact on future enforcement of voter intimidation and deceptive
practices. For example, in United States v. Brown, the U.S. Department of
Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section brought the first case pursuant to
Section 2 of the VRA 122 on behalf of white voters in Noxubee, Mississippi. 123

118. The first, United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219, 222 (E.D. La. 1966), was filed in
1965 and was unsuccessful. Id at 237. The Department alleged that, in violation of Section 11 (b)
and Section 1971(b), the defendants terminated sharecropping and tenant-farming relationships
with blacks who had registered to vote, evicted such persons from rental homes, and discharged
them from salaried jobs. Id. at 222. Concluding that the intimidation statutes exceeded Congress'
power and that, in any event, the Department had failed to prove intimidation, the court granted
judgment for the defendants. Id at 226,237.
119. Id. at221 (voter intimidation); United States v. N.C. Republican Party (voter deception);
United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (voter intimidation), aff'd, 561 F.3d
420 (5th Cir. 2009); Complaint, United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, No.
09-0065 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.eduJelectionlaw/litigation/
documentsIBlackPanther-Complaint-1-7-09 .pdf (voter intimidation).
120. See, e.g., Brown, 494 F. Supp 440 (voter intimidation).
121. !d. (DOJ brought a Section 2 and Section 11(b) challenge against racial minorities for
alleged voter intimidation); Complaint, United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense,
No. 09-0065 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7,2009) (DOJ filed a voter intimidation challenge against members of
the New Black Panther Party).
122. The VRA contains two primary enforcement provisions. Section 2 prohibits
discrimination in voting based on race, color, language, or minority status. Section 5 requires
specified jurisdictions to submit all of their voting administration changes to the Attorney General
or U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia prior to implementation. Congress included a
national prohibition against discrimination in voting in Section 2 ofthe Act. The provision imposes
a prohibition against racial discrimination in any voting standard, practice or procedure, including
redistricting plans. Under Section 2, "[P]laintiffs must demonstrate that ... the devices result in
unequal access to the electoral process." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,46 (1986).
123. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 422. The District Court judge noted that this was certainly "an
unconventional, if not unprecedented use of the Voting Rights Act." !d. at 443. The court opined:
[D]efendants proclaim it "preposterous" that the Justice Department-a Justice
Department they maintain has for decades been wholly unresponsive to complaints of
voting discrimination by black citizens-would have the temerity to come into this court
claiming that blacks in Noxubee County, who were oppressed by the white
establishment for 135 years and who finally gained the reins of power a mere 12 years
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Under a cloud of criticism, the Department brought a voter intimidation
lawsuit against African American defendants. 124 This was an interesting choice,
because in most acts of voter intimidation and deception, African Americans and
members of other minority communities are the victims, not the perpetrators. 125
In Brown,126 the court found that the defendants had violated Section 2 of the
VRA.127 Regarding the Section 11 (b) claim, the district court found that Brown's
actions during a 2003 Democratic primary had "a racial element," but did not
constitute a threat that affected the right to vote. 128
George W. Bush's administration brought a second case against African
Americans shortly after the 2008 elections, using its Section 11 (b) authority that
involved poll watchers in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 129 In United States v. New
Black Panther Party, MS,130 the Department alleged that members of the New
Black Panther Party brandished weapons and made racial slurs at both black and
white voters outside a polling place. I3I Among criticism, \32 the newly elected

ago, have discriminated against whites in that county.
Id. at 480. The defendants further argued that white citizens in Noxubee County could not
demonstrate the critical requirements under the VRA, including a history of official discrimination,
under-representation in elections, discrimination in "education, employment or health," and an
unresponsive government. Id. at 483. The defendants further argued that Section 2 was "being
launched as a missile without an enemy." Id. at 480.
124. See Adam Nossiter, U.S. Says Blacks in Mississippi Suppress White Vote, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 11,2006, atAl8, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2006/10/1I1us/politics/llvoting.html;
Peter Whoriskey, Alleged Voting Rights Violation with Twist Goes to Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 16,
2007, at 2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com!wp-dyn/contentlarticleI2007/01115/
AR200701 1501 196.html.
125. LoGAN, supra note 15. The overwhelming accounts ofvoter intimidation and particularly
voter deception target minority communities. See supra notes 15-19.
126. 561 F.3d 420.
127. Id. at 434-35.
128. United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440, 477 n.56 (S.D. Miss. 2007), affd, 561 F.3d
4420 (5th Cir. 2009).
129. Press Release, Dep't of Just., Justice Department Seeks Injunction Against New Black
Panther Party (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-crto14.html.
130. United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, No. 09-0065 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
7, 2009), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.eduielectionlaw/litigationidocumentslBlkPants-Judgmt5-18-09.pdf. In its complaint the Department alleged that the defendants violated Section 11(b)
through "armed and uniformed personnel at the entrance to the polling location," "[t]he loud and
open use ofracial slurs," and essentially creating an "intimidating and threatening presence" outside
the polls. Complaint at 4-5, United States v. New Black Panther Party for Self-Defense, No. 090065 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edulelectionlaw/litigationl
documentsIBlackPanther-Complaint-l-7-09. pdf
131. The members of the New Black Panther Party outside the polling place described
themselves as "security" and "concerned citizens." Youtube.com, "Security" Patrols Stationed at
Polling Places in Philly, http://www.youtube.com!watch?v=neGbKHyGuHU&feature=player_

2010]

VOTER DECEPTION

367

administration decided not to pursue the case and dropped the charges against the
defendants. 133 It is not clear that the New Black Panther Party members actually
intimidated voters, particularly as the police allowed one member of the New
Black Panther Party to remain at the polls.134 Nonetheless, the presence of a
weapon outside of a polling site could threaten or intimidate a voter from
entering. The government's dismissal of this case either demonstrated its
inability to prove the necessary elements ofthe statute (i.e., threats, intimidation,
coercion) or a political decision not to prosecute. Regardless, the government's
decision to pursue and abandon this case demonstrates the powerlessness of the
statute in its present form.
The federal government has brought only one case under the civil
enforcement statute that arguably involved intimidation and deception. The hotly
contested 1990 U. S. Senate race involving incumbent Jesse Helms and challenger
Harvey Gantt I 35 was especially contentious and at times extremely race-based. 136
It is commonly held that Helms regained the lead in a faltering campaign when
he aired an advertisement that played to the fears and prejudices of North
Carolina citizens. 137

embedded. The police removed one member of the party who held a nightstick, but all owed a
second member to remain. Stu Bykofsky, Sometimes, Intimidation Is in Eye of Beholder, PHIL.
DAILY NEWS, June 8, 2009, Local, at 6.
132. Jerry Seper, Career Lawyers Overrnled on Voting Case, WASH. TIMEs, May 29, 2009,
atA1.avaiiableathttp://www.washingtontimes.comlnews/2009/may129/career-lawyers-overruledon-voting-case/ (noting that career lawyers, who sought to pursue sanctions against the members
ofthe New Black Panther Party, were overruled by political appointees). See Editorial, Protecting
Black Panthers; The Obama Administration Ignores Voter Intimidation, WASH. TIMES, May 29,
2009, at A20 (arguing that the members' conduct was in clear violation ofthe VRA because the Act
prohibits "any 'attempt to intimidate, threaten or coerce,' any voter or those aiding voters" and
criticizing the Department of Justice for dropping such a "blatant intimidation" case).
133. Seper, supra note 132.
134. See Bykofsky, supra note 131.
135. Harvey Gantt was a civil rights pioneer. He was the first African American admitted to
Clemson University in 1963, and he graduated with honors from Clemson and received a master's
degree in city planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Harvey Gantt,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM, http://projects.newsobserver.comlunder_the_ dome/profiles/harvey~antt.
He served as mayor of Charlotte, North Carolina from 1983 to 1987 and on the city council from
1974 to 1983. Id. He ran unsuccessfully for U.S. Senate against Jesse Helms in 1990 and in 1996.
Id.
136. /d.
137. In the "White Hands" advertisement, the commercial begins with a white male-showing
only his hands--opening a letter and then throwing it away. The announcer then says,
You needed that job, and you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a
minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair? Harvey Gantt says it is. Gantt
supports Ted Kennedy's racial quota law that makes the color of your skin more
important than your qualifications. You'll vote on this issue next Tuesday. For racial
quotas, Harvey Gantt. Against racial quotas, Jesse Helms.
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In a continuation of these tactics and an example of classic voter deception,
predominately African American communities received 125,000 postcards
containing misleading information on voter eligibility and threatening them with
vote fraud prosecutions.1 38 After the election, a Department of Justice lawsuit
resulted in a consent decree prohibiting the state's Republican Party "from
targeting voters based on their 'racial minority status,' and required it to obtain
prior court approval for its anti-fraud activities.,,139 The Department settled the
case based on its authority to protect against race discrimination under Section
2 of the VRA, but arguably not under its authority contained within the civil
penalties. 140
The federal government's lack of enforcement of voter intimidation and its
most recent application to traditional beneficiaries of the VRA are quite
instructive. Department of Justice officials questioned whether Section 11 (b)
could apply to deceptive practices, such as the Senator Cardin example, 141 but the
officials used the statute against black citizens, in the face of overwhelming
evidence that vote intimidation is typically committed against minorities, not by
them. Granted, the federal Section 11 (b) cases did not involve anonymous
actions or publications; however, the need to enjoin practices promulgated
against minority communities that intimidate and deceive voters is evident. The
choice and lack of enforcement of Section 11 (b) and other statutes to address

YouTube.com, Jesse Helms's "Hands" ad, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIyewCdXMzk.
After airing the "White Hands" political advertisement, Senator Helms moved up considerably in
the polls and ultimately won the election. See ABC News Services, Sen. Jesse Helms Dead at 86:
Polarizing North Carolina Lawmaker Known as 'Senator No', July 4,2008, http://abcnews.go.
comlUS/story?id=5309543&page= 1.
138. Press Release, N.C. Democratic Party, North Carolina Democrats Announce
Unprecedented Election Protection Program (Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://www.ncdp.org/
north_carolina_democrats_election""protection; see U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, supra
note 39, at 13-14 (defining election crimes to include dissemination offalse information regarding
eligibility to vote).
139. JUSTIN LEVITT & ANDREW ALLISON, REpORTED INSTANCES OF VOTER CAGING 3 (2007),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/pager-i/d/download_file_49609 .pdf Such direct mail
marketing campaigns are also known as "vote caging" schemes, utilized to indicate potential vote
challenges. Vote caging is
a three-stage process designed to identify persons in another party or faction whose
names are on a voter registration list, but whose legal qualification to vote is dubious,
and then to challenge their qualification either before or on Election Day. Ostensibly,
caging is an attempt to prevent voter fraud. In practice, it may have the effect of
disenfranchising voters who are legitimately registered.
Chandler Davidson et a\., Vote Caging as a Republican Ballot Security Technique, 34 WM.
MrrCHELLL. REv. 533, 537-38 (2008) (discussing voter deception through vote caging methods).
140. Although this case could serve as a classic voter intimidation or deception case, the case
was brought and settled under a purposeful discrimination theory under Section 2 of the VRA.
141. See INTRODUCTION, supra. Samples of such flyers are available at NATIONALCAMPAIGN
FOR FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 1.
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other voter suppression tactics evidence the need for more protections. With
only a few Section 11 (b) cases in the history of the statute and a lack of a federal
statute that unequivocally addresses deceptive practices, the impotence of the
civil statutes and the indecision of the criminal statutes in their current
configuration are clearly revealed. In fact, the government has yet to bring a
successful intimidation case under the civil statute. 142

B. State Voter Intimidation and Deceptive Practices Statutes
States have instituted an array of statutes seeking to address voter
intimidation, fraud, and deception. Thirty-nine states have statutes that
specifically bar some form of voter intimidation, deceptive practices, or both.
Most laws can be divided into three categories, based on the type of false
information that is outlawed. The first category of statutes outlaw the
dissemination of false information regarding election administration, such as
registration and polling site activity.143 The second category outlaws false
information on candidates or issues, such as making a false statement about a
candidate or a proposition,144 while the third category of statutes address both
election administration and candidate or other substantive issues. 145 Ofthe thirtynine states that have laws addressing some form of voter intimidation and
deceptive practices, only nine states consider a violation of their voter
intimidation statutes as a felony; 146and only fifteen find the offender guilty of a

142. See United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440, 477 n.56 (S.D. Miss. 2007), aff'd, 561
F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the government's lack of pursuit and triumph and that "the
Government has given little attention to this claim, and stat[ing] that it has found no case in which
plaintiffs have prevailed under this section").
143. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1005.1 (West2007)(consideringitamisdemeanorto
knowingly communicate false election information to a registered voter about the time, date or place
of voting and also prohibiting false information regarding a voter's polling site or registration
status).
144. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05 (West 2004) (prohibiting "false representation[s]
pertaining to a candidate or referendum which [are] intended ... to affect voting at an election").
145. For example, Louisiana precludes the dissemination of any "oral, visual, or written
material containing ... a false statement about a candidate ... or about a proposition." LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (2004) as well as information regarding voting or registration. Id. §§
18:1461, 18:1461.1. The parsing of various types of false information to election administration,
candidates, and the like helps to ensure that these laws are not overbroad and consistent with the
state's compelling interest. See supra Part n.B (discussing constitutional considerations).
146. Perhaps the most stringent state is South Carolina, which imposes a ten-year sentence of
imprisonment and possibly a fine for a violation of its voter intimidation statute. The South
Carolina statute reads:
A person who, at any of the elections, general, special, or primary, in any city, town,
ward, or polling precinct, threatens, mistreats, or abuses a voter with a view to control
or intimidate him in the free exercise of his right of suffrage, is guilty of a felony and,
upon conviction, must be fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more
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misdemeanor. 147 Ofthose states that include penalties for intimidation, only five
states include "fraud" in their statutes penalizing intimidation. 148 Only four states
also penalize voter deception. 149
On the issue of e-deception, a few states include laws that are broadly
construed such that they may apply to the traditional means of deception and
online voting deception. 150 The litany of statutes and their attributes leads at best
to piecemeal enforcement. lsl In most cases, the intimidation or fraud cases are

than ten years, or both.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-25-80 (1976).
147. The majority of states that impose penalties for voter intimidation only find offenders
guilty of misdemeanors; most impose a class A misdemeanor. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-17-33
(1975) (class A misdemeanor for intimidation, threats, etc.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103 (West
2010) (class A misdemeanor for intimidation, threats, etc.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-115 (West
2009) (class A misdemeanor for "force or threats"); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-607 (2006) (class 1
misdemeanor for any person who "hinder[ s], intimidate[ s] or interfere[s] with any qualified voter").
Delaware allows a civil action against the offender and allow the petitioner to recover $500. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5162 (West 2006).
148. See CAL. ELEc. CODE § 18573 (West 2003) (stating that a person is "guilty ofa felony"
ifhe or she "defrauds any voter at any election by deceiving and causing him or her to vote for a
different person for any office than he or she intended or desired to vote for"); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-2305 (West 1972) (determining that "[a] person who ... defrauds any elector ... is guilty of
a misdemeanor"); MD. CODE ANN. ELEc. LAW. § 16-201 (2009) (maintaining that "[a] person may
not willfully and knowingly [i]nfluence or attempt to influence a voter's decision through ...
fraud"); S.C. CODE § 7-25-190 (2009) (pronouncing that "[a] person ... who by force, intimidation,
deception, [or] fraud ... controls the vote of any voter ... is guilty of a felony"); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3-9-10 (West 2002) (declaring that "[a]ny person who shall, by ... fraud ... prevent or
attempt to prevent any ... voter ... from freely exercising his right of suffrage at any election" is
guilty of a misdemeanor).
149. Florida, Illinois, Kansas, and Minnesota penalize voter deception. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 104.0615 (West 2008) (including in the purview of the statute false information to induce or
compel an individual to vote orrefrain from voting); 10 Ill... COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29-4 (West 2003)
(penalizing "[a]ny person who, by ... deception ... knowingly prevents" another from voting or
registering to vote); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2415 (1974) (including the mailing or publishing of
false infonnation as proscribed voter intimidation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204C.035 (2006)
(prohibiting a person from "knowingly deceiv[ing] another person" about election information).
150. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-17-38 (1975) (prohibiting "[a]nyperson ... by any ... corrupt
means, [from] attempt[ing] to influence any elector in giving his or her vote, deter[ ring] the elector
from giving the same, or disturb[ing] or hinder[ing] the elector in the free exercise ofthe right of
suffrage"). For a comprehensive analysis of current laws and their applicability to online voter
deception, see Common Cause, supra note 23.
151. See, e.g., Kamins v. Bd. of Elections for D.C., 324 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1987) (finding that
certain write-in voters should have been counted and remanded for other proceedings); Pabey v.
Pastrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138, 1151 (Ind. 2004) (granting relief to plaintiff for proving "that a
deliberate series of actions occurred"); Rogers v. Holder, 636 So. 2d 645 (Miss. 1994) (upholding
election results despite known departures from absentee voting provisions).
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brought, while the deceptive practices are allowed to continue without penalty
or investigation.
Although most state voter intimidation statutes contain language similar to
the federal statutes prohibiting intimidation, e.g., "[i]t shall be unlawful ... to
intimidate, threaten, or coerce,"152 the best-structured statutes that would
encompass deception do not limit the illegal actions to those containing threats.
Those statutes highlight the intentional falsehood to manipulate voters regarding
an election administration matter, such as the date ofthe election. Nonetheless,
state statutes that specifically address deceptive practices can serve as a model
for other legislation. A Kansas statute that became effective in 2001, serves as
a model for states seeking to encompass the distinct instances of voter
suppression, including deception. Statutes that include criminal or harsh civil
penalties can have a deterrent effect and lessen the impact of these practices.
Whether on the state or federal level, the need for a more precise
criminalization of deceptive practices is warranted. Most statutes addressing
some form of "election crimes" ignore the impact and harm that voter deception
causes. Although some statutes exist for either voter fraud or intimidation, few
comprehensive laws address documented and resurgent deceptive practices.
Thus, acts of voter dilution can best be addressed through vigorous enforcement
and more inclusive interpretation of existing statutes.
ill. ENDING DECEPTION

The history of election regulation in America "reveals a persistent battle
against two evils: voter intimidation and election fraud.,,153 Voter intimidation
and deceptive practices have in large part not been regulated or litigated in the
United States. 154 Any revisions or new regulations must adequately include
constitutional considerations that secure and protect the right to vote. Although
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution provides the authority to combat voter deception, Congress should
also strengthen existing statutes to address deceptive practices.

A. Equal Protection Clause
Governments have a significant interest in protecting their citizens from
deceptive practices. The U.S. Supreme Court has found compelling interests in

152. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-17-33 (1 975)(effective January I, 2007)(barringintimidation
and threats for the election of"any candidate for state or local office or any other proposition at any
election"). The statute also qualifies intimidation as a class A misdemeanor. Id.
153. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206-10 (1992) (holding that a Tennessee statute
prohibiting the solicitation ofvotes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100
feet of the entrance to any polling place was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest
in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud, as required by the First Amendment).
154. See supra Part II.A.
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laws that sought to prevent voter intimidation I55 and voter fraud. 156 The right to
vote and participate in the political process free from intimidation and fraud is
strikingly similar to issues surrounding deceptive practices. Voting is different
from other rights in a democratic society, in that the right to vote and to do so
without interference is a linchpin of our democracy. 157 Accordingly, efforts to
distort, mislead, connive, and deceive are worthy of federal constitutional
protections. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well
as various existing federal and state statutes, assist the government in its pursuit
of free access to the franchise.
In Crawfordv. Marion County, 158 the U.S. Supreme Court found that Indiana
had two legitimate reasons for adopting a voter identification law that limited the
number of acceptable forms of identification to government-issued photo
identifications.ls9 The Court found that Indiana's desire to deter and detect voter
fraud and its interest in promoting voter confidence were sufficient to find the
voter identification statute constitutional. I6o These ideals are paramount in the
need to provide governmental protection against deceptive practices.
Governmental entities possess a need to deter and detect voter deception and the
lack of enforcement of deceptive practices adversely affects voter confidence,
particularly in incidents such as the Franklin County, Ohio, flyer that appeared
to have the stamp of a legitimate governmental office. 161 These kinds of acts tend
to cause voters to question the integrity of the electoral process. Regarding
public confidence, the Crawford Court found that public confidence
"encourage[d] citizen participation in the democratic process.,,162

B. First Amendment Concerns
Although an Equal Protection argument exists for persistent vigilance

155. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 206.
156. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623 (2008) (holding that
purported state interests for an Indiana statute requiring government-issued photo identification to
vote were sufficient to justify the limitation imposed on voters).
157. See Yick Wov. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)(declaringthat"thepolitical franchise
of voting is ... regarded as a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights").
158. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
159. Id. at 1616-17.
160. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1617, 1624. Each of Indiana's asserted interests is
unquestionably relevant to its interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral
process. See id. at 1617 (noting that the opponents of the law did not "question the legitimacy of
the interests the State has identified").
161. See supra Part I.A.
162. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1620 (holding that state's interests identified asjustifications for
Indiana statute requiring government-issued photo identification to vote were sufficient to justify
any limitation imposed on voters). Indiana's interest in protecting public confidence in elections,
although closely related to its interest in preventing voter fraud, has independent significance
because such confidence encourages citizen participation in the democratic process.
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regarding voter deception, other constitutional constraints must also be
considered. The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he freedom of speech and of
the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the
United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are
secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a
state. ,,163
In considering voter intimidation and deceptive practices, the fundamental
right to vote and political speech are fIrmly juxtaposed. This juxtaposition
requires balancing the right to vote with free speech and must be considered
when addressing the dearth of all-inclusive voter suppression legislation. In
constructing and strengthening state and federal legislation, one must not only
consider the rights and freedoms of the affected citizenry, but also the rights of
the deceiver.
1. First Amendment and Political Speech.-The First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution protects the right to speak freely. 164 This right to speak freely,
however, should not include the right to speak falsely with intent to impair
another's rights. A major purpose of the First Amendment is to protect "the free
discussion of governmental affairs.,,165 The Supreme Court has also noted, "For
speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government. ,,166 Freedom of expression is at the root of our participatory
democracy.167 The First Amendment serves the greater purpose of promoting a
democratic government and serves the people's interest in having the information
they need to enable self-government. 168 Historically, the First Amendment has

163. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,95,101-02 (1940) (citations omitted) (noting that
"[ t]he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment").
164. U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances"). The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
makes the First Amendment applicable to the states. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
277 (1964).
165. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 220 (1966) (holding that the Alabama Corrupt
Practices Act as providing criminal penalties for publication of newspaper editorial on election day
urging people to vote a certain way on specific issues violated the constitutional protection offree
speech and press).
166. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (holding that the statute is
unconstitutional as punishing false statements against public officials 1) if made with ill will
without regard to whether they were made with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard
of whether they are true or false or 2) if not made in reasonable belief of their truth).
167. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (holding that people
should decide for themselves "the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence" and noting that "[o]ur political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal").
168. Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National
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"preserve [d] an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.,,169 The First Amendment protections are paramount on issues involving
political debate. 17o
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has continued to protect freedom of
political speechl71 and upholds statutes that affect this fundamental right only if
such restrictions "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.,,172
The Supreme Court defines core speech protected under the First
Amendment as "both the expression of a desire for political change and a
discussion of the merits of the proposed change.,,173 In limiting political speech,
the legislative body "must . . . be prepared . . . to articulate and support its
argument with a reasoned and substantial basis demonstrating the link between
the regulation and the asserted governmental interest.,,174
The Supreme Court has found various expressions to be protected political
speech, inter alia, the right to peaceably assemble,175 the right to criticize

Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 1227, 1238, 1267, 1269 (1986) (arguing that in
Bel/otti, "the Court confinned its discovery that commercial speech is not unprotected by the [F) irst
[A]mendment and announced a novel doctrine that corporate speech is not unprotected by the
[F]irst [A]mendment").
169. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390,400-01 (1969) (holding that the FCC's
order requiring that a person who is attacked on the air receive the opportunity to rebut was
authorized by Congress and enhanced freedom of speech under the First Amendment rather than
infringing this right).
170. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)(finding that the First Amendment
"has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political
office").
171. This protection applies to written materials and verbal communications. See Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,302,305 (1965) (finding a statute unconstitutional that requires the
post office department to detain and destroy unsealed mail from foreign countries that is determined
to be communist political propaganda unless addressee returns a reply card indicating his desire to
receive such piece of mail).
172. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 183 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983» (holding that statute denying "'display' of
any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring public notice to a party, organization, or
movement" in or on the grounds of the Supreme Court building was unconstitutional because it
could not be justified as a reasonable place provision).
173. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22, 428 (1988) (holding that a prohibition against
paying circulators violated the First Amendment).
174. Mitchell v. Comm'n on Adult Entm't Establishments of Del., 10 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir.
1993) (citation omitted).
175. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980) (indicating that
"[p]eople assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action, but also to listen, observe,
and learn; indeed, they may 'assembl[e) for any lawful purpose"') (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496,519 (1939».
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government officials,176 campaign finance,l77 signage,178 circulating petitions for
signatures 179 with limited regard for truth,180 and speech regarding the American
flag. 181 Not all speech is protected, including some political speech, e.g., false
commercial speech,182 electioneering within a certain distance of an entrance to
a polling place on Election Day,183 and destroying secret service certificates. 184
The Supreme Court has also noted that "[r]egulations which permit the
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be
tolerated under the First Amendment.,,185 A statute is suspect under content-

176. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132, 136-37 (I 966)(rightto oppose national foreign policy
and other governmental actions or criticize government officials).
177. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,440
(200 I ) (concluding that "[s]pending for political ends and contributing to political candidates both
fall within the First Amendment's protection ofspeech and political association"); see also Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,44 (1976) (holding that provisions limiting individual contributions to
campaigns were constitutional despite First Amendment objections).
178. Sambo's of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177, 179 (1979) (noting
that communication by signs and posters is considered to be "a pure matter of speech").
179. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.s. 414,421 (1988) ("The circulation of an initiative petition of
necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits
of the proposed change.").
180. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) ("Authoritative interpretations of
the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test
oftruth-whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials-and especially one that
puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker.").
181. The Court has upheld decisions recognizing the communicative nature ofconduct relating
to flags, including attaching a peace sign to the flag, refusing to salute the flag, and displaying a red
flag. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)(citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405,409-10 (1974» (upholding attaching peace flag to sign); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632, 636 (1943) (finding that refusing to salute the flag is constitutionally
protected); Strombergv. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1931) (finding that displaying a red flag
is constitutionally protected).
182. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 479-80 (2005) ("The threshold inquiry is whether
the commercial speech involves unlawful activity or is misleading.")
183. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,206,211 (1992). In Burson, the Court recognized that
the exercise of free speech rights conflicts with the fundamental right to cast a ballot in an election
free from intimidation and fraud. Id. at 211. Given the conflict between these two rights, the Court
held that "requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling places does not
constitute an unconstitutional compromise." Id.
184. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968). The Court held that "[a] law
prohibiting destruction of Selective Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its face
than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting
the destruction of books and records." Id
185. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49, 659 (1984) (holding that the purpose
requirement contained in a statute that regulated publication or production of illustrations offederal
currency was unconstitutional).
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based scrutiny if it "threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or
viewpoints.,,186 But a statute is suspect under content-neutral scrutiny when it is
"intended to serve purposes unrelated to the content of the regulated speech,
despite their incidental effects on some speakers but not others.,,187
A statute similar to the one used in Kansas serves as an example of contentneutral nondiscriminatory regulation on political speech. Indeed, the Kansas
statute provides a complete description of voter deception, including electronic
deception. This statute makes it a crime to intimidate, threaten, coerce, or
attempt to intimidate "for the purpose of interfering with the right ... to vote"
and specifically outlaws deceptive practices by criminalizing "mailing,
publishing, broadcasting, telephoning, or transmitting by any means false
information.,,188 It is sufficiently broad, but not unduly burdensome or vague.
It specifically outlaws certain practices that are generally deemed voter
suppression, and it also specifically identifies actions that constitute voter
deception. The statute is limited in scope and addresses the state's need to
protect its citizens from voter deception.
2. Political Speech and Anonymity.-The anonymous nature of voter
deception makes it difficult to prosecute. Moreover, the advent of electronic
deception exacerbates this difficulty.189 The Constitution protects the ability to
remain anonymous 190 but does not protect against some false speech;91 while
protecting others. 192 For example, it can protect a candidate's ability to stretch
the truth, but no such protection exists for intentionally distributing false political

186. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 443, 447 (1991) (holding that Arkansas's extension
of its generally applicable sales tax to cable television services alone, or to cable and satellite
services, while exempting print media, does not violate First Amendment).
187. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members ofN. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 12122 n.· (1991).
188. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2415 (2000). Kansas defines voter intimidation as threats,
coercion or inter alia, publishing false information, which is probably the most closely targeted
statute that addresses voter deception. See id.
189. See generally Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation ofHate Speech in
a Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 497 (2009) (discussing the difficulty in pursuing hate
speech conducted via the Internet).
190. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
191. United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 480 (2005) ("The threshold inquiry is whether the
commercial speech involves unlawful activity or is misleading.").
192. The Court will protect a candidate's promise to the electorate. See Brown v. Hartlage,
456 U.S. 45, 53, 55 (1982), which holds:
The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in
the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own
election and the election of other candidates. Indeed, it is of particular importance that
candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the
electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their
positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day.
/d. at 53 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,52-53 (1976».
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infonnation.
Although the Supreme Court has prescribed protections to allow for political
privacy in publishing material for public consumption and in developing
legislation to counter deceptive practices, legislators must consider the nature of
the actions that regularly involve the distribution of anonymous political
literature. The Supreme Court has held, "[u ]nder our Constitution, anonymous
pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition
of advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the
majority.,,193
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission demonstrates how the dissemination
of knowingly false infonnation differs from expressing one's political opinion. 194
The Court noted the importance of anonymous political literature l95 and the
state's authority to limit the right to free speech to protect against false or
misleading infonnation and fraud. 196 The Court determined that the proper
analysis involved the application of "'exacting scrutiny' and [would] ... uphold
the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
interest. ,,197
Laws requiring identification of an author on political literature were
primarily developed to protect citizens and enable them to assess the
infonnation's validity and integrity. 198 But preventative measures must not come
at the expense of eligible voters and should not involve efforts to outwit voters.
The Supreme Court has found that voter intimidation severely burdens on the
right to vote and efforts to prevent intimidation must involve a compelling state
interest. 199

193. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
194. The Supreme Court reviewed Ohio's blanket prohibition against distributing anonymous
campaign literature. The Court considered whether the promotion was constitutional as applied to
the plaintiff's distribution of unsigned flyers opposing a school tax. Id. at 337-38,340.
195. The Court noted, "'Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have
played an important role in the progress of mankind. '" Id. at 341 (quoting Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 64 (1960)).
196. See id. at 348; see also Rachel J. Grabow, Note, Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commission:
Protecting the Freedom o/Speech or Damaging the Electoral Process?, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 565,
570 ( 1997) (detailing the First Amendment case law that addresses anonymous speech and assesses
the right to distribute anonymous literature under the Supreme Court's First Amendment rulings);
Note, Gutter Politics and the First Amendment, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 185, 198 (1972); Erika King,
Comment, Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144
(1995).
197. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.
198. See Grabow, supra note 196, at 583-85 (indicating that identification statutes were often
held valid because of the state's interests "in facilitating the flow of information to the public and
maintaining the civility and integrity of the electoral process").
199. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,206 (1992). In Burson, the Court addressed
whether Tennessee's statute prohibiting the distribution of campaign paraphernalia or soliciting
votes within one hundred feet ofthe polling place violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Voter deception often arises from false information printed anonymously
with no indication ofthe true author or distributor. 2oo The deceptive information
also may be printed with seemingly official seal from a governmental agency.201
The documents could credibly be considered "anonymous leafiets,"202 which the
Supreme Court has decided are afforded some constitutional protections.
The state needs to lessen the tensions between voter intimidation, voter
fraud, and other measures that undermine voter confidence, like voter
deception. 203 Additionally, the Constitution places even broader limits on
deceptive practices. The state has a compelling interest in ensuring that
information regarding the time, place, and manner of elections and voter
eligibility are accurately communicated. Protecting the accuracy of these
statements to preserve the integrity of the franchise and ensure access to voting
is a compelling state interest. Although political speech is strongly encouraged
in this democratic society, the Supreme Court has carved out a restriction on that
speech where the state is attempting to protect against harmful false information.
Clearly, no right exists for distributing false information that addresses the time,
place, and manner of elections, but just as clearly, no penalties exist.
3. Contrasting Campaign Finance as Speech.-The anonymous nature of
voter intimidation and deceptive acts and the protections provided against those
acts lie in stark contrast to campaign finance laws, where a contributor's identity
is required under federal statute. 204 For example, a primary challenge in
enforcing existing voter intimidation and deceptive practices laws is the
difficulty in identifying the culprit. 205 In many instances, political and Election
Day pamphlets are required to include some identifying information.206 Courts
have found that the requirement to include identifying information within the
province of the First Amendment is compelling, as was the state's interest in
addressing voter fraud and promoting the ability to investigate false claims.207

Id The Court found that the legislation passed constitutional muster. Id at 211.
200. See Howard Libit & Tim Craig, Politicking Heats Up as Election Day Nears, BALT. SUN,
Nov. 4, 2002, at lA; Eric Siegel, Amid Stir, Voters Stream to Polls, BALT. SUN, Nov, 6, 2002, at
27A. A flyer was distributed in Pennsylvania falsely indicating that Republicans would vote on
November 2 and Democrats would vote on November 3 to cut down on lines. NATIONAL
CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at I.
201. See NATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR ELECTIONS, supra note 1.
202. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 350.
203. The Court has also found that states have a compelling interest in preventing voter fraud
and intimidation. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1617, 1624
(2008).
204. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006). Federal campaign finance laws regulate the money spent
by political actors to influence federal campaigns.
205. See supra Part III.B.2.
206. Some states require that the sponsor of the political literature be identified. See
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
207. See Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm'n, 762 A.2d 880,885 (Conn. 2000).
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Much has been written about First Amendment rights and campaign
finance. 2os In the landmark case Buckley v. Valeo,209 the Supreme Court
addressed whether restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures, inter
alia, violated free speech.2lO The Court ruled that the restrictions on expenditure
limits
necessarily reduce [d] the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed .... It is clear that a primary effect of these
expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by
individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions ... limit political
expression "at the core of our electoral process and of First Amendment
freedoms.,,211
Consequently, the lack of attention to the perennial occurrence in the
minority community and the lack of protection rise in sharp contrast to the welldocumented and legislated campaign finance rules barring anonymous political
literature. Indeed, any communications, published media or electronic media,
endorsing or criticizing a candidate must meet strict restrictions, including
acknowledging the source responsible for the information. 212
The First Amendment does not require identification in most political
speech.213 The false, misleading political speech involved in voter deception
does not fall within this constitutional protection. Governments have a
compelling interest in preventing voter deception and can construct laws that are
narrowly tailored to meet those goals. The presence of deceptive practices and
intimidation seeks to quiet the voices of voters. Statutes must protect the ability
to challenge and correct voter suppression activities. 214 Legislation addressing

208. See, e.g., Yasmin Dawood, Democracy, Power, and the Supreme Court: Campaign
Finance Reform in a Comparative Context, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 269 (2006); Candice J. Nelson,
Problems in the Laboratories, 2 ELECT. LJ. 403 (2003) (reviewing MONEY, POLITICS AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM LAW IN TIlE STATES (David Schultzed., 2002»; Christopher J. Ayers,
Comment, Perry v. Bartlett: A Preliminary Test for Campaign Finance Reform, 79 N.C. L. REv.
1788 (2001).
209. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
210. The case centered on interpretations ofthe Federal Election Campaign Act, and the Court
found that provisions limiting individual contributions to campaigns were constitutional despite
First Amendment objections. Id. at 35.
211. Id. at 19,39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968».
212. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) ("Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the
membership of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular
municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, educational, or
recreational purposes.").
213. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 354, 357 (1995).
214. Voter intimidation undermines not only an individual's ability to participate in the
electoral process but also affects group right to access the ballot. Voting is in large part a group
right. In traditional electoral schemes, such as one person, one vote cases, courts determine the
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voter deception falls squarely within constitutional parameters for restrictions on
political speech. The First Amendment does not protect one's ability to lie or
obstruct the democratic process. States must narrowly tailor their laws to address
the distribution of misleading fraudulent information and protect citizens' right
to speak freely.

C. Election Clause Powers
Governments have the power to legislate and restrict political speech.
Although laws exist, the patchwork of applicable language and lack of penalties
require strengthening and, in some instances, creating laws to address these
actions. Despite the government's relative inaction or questionable actions in
enforcing voter intimidation statutes, Congress is keenly stationed to provide
protections against the knowing propagation of false election materials and has
the constitutional authority to do SO.215 Notwithstanding the states' authority to
develop election administration laws governing the time, place, and manner of
elections, Congress maintains authority to make or alter the states' regulations
for the election of federal offices.216 Recent cases under the Elections Clause
reinforce Congress's broad authority to regulate all aspects of the federal
officials election. 217
Congress's ability to use its Elections Clause power to "protect voters" from
false information in federal elections is c1ear.218 As the Supreme Court held in
Burson v. Freeman,219 the states have "a compelling interest in protecting voters
from confusion and undue influence" and in safeguarding "the integrity of its
election process. ,,220 Consequently, Congress has the authority to act under either

right as related to a particular group. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing
and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, III HARv. L. REv. 2276, 2282 n.30 (1998) (arguing
that one person, one vote cases "should be viewed as cases about group political power ... rather
than purely about individual rights").
215. Congress has the power to regulate elections under the Elections Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I (specifying that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators").
216. Congress can regulate the elections of Representatives and Senators. See, e.g., United
States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 482 (1917); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,383-84 (1879);
United States v. Manning, 215 F. Supp. 272, 286-87 (W.D. La. 1963); Commonwealth ex rei.
Dummit v. O'Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691,693-94 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944).
217. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24 (2001) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,
366 (1932)) (finding that the Elections Clause "encompasses matters like 'notices, registration,
supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention offraud and corrupt practices, counting of
votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns''').
218. See Ass'n ofCmty. Org. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833,838 (6th Cir. 1997).
219. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
220. Id. at 199 (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228-29,
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its Elections Clause or other constitutional powers to protect its citizens from
voter deception.

IV. A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The Supreme Court stated that "[n]o right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are
illusory ifthe right to vote is undennined. ,,221 Likewise, voter suppression affects
groups-racial, ethnic or language minorities-and the freedom to participate
without restraint in the democratic process. Groups' ability to vote is thwarted
when deceptive practices and other suppressive measures are allowed to continue
without penalty. Congress can use its constitutional authority to address the
current inequities in the lack of enforcement regarding voter deception.
The Supreme Court has held, "the government may regulate the time, place,
and manner of the expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are content
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
leave open ample alternatives for communication. ,,222 The nature of voter
deception, i.e., anonymity, targeting racial and language minorities, and
intentionally distributing false information in an attempt to deter targeted voters
from the polls, all contribute to the need for better statutory construction and
enforcement. The "right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the
essence of a democratic society.,,223 Connivery, falsehoods, and misleading
voters thwart and negate those freedoms.
The present voter intimidation and deceptive practices statutes are
dramatically underperfonning. Policy reasons for addressing the weaknesses of
the federal statutes-such as allowing unfettered access to the electoral process,
providing accurate information to voters, inspiring voter confidence, and
ultimately promoting fundamental democratic ideals-also continue to exist.
Although recognizing its authority to do so under the Fourteenth Amendment and
other applicable constitutional amendments, Congress must either strengthen
existing statutes or adopt new legislation that covers the breadth of new
millennium attempts to intimidate and deceive voters.
The lack of clarity and enforcement illustrates the need for legislation that
clearly defines deceptive practices and develops mechanisms to ensure that such
acts are investigated and that legislation contains appropriate penalties. The most
important principles to consider are whether the person or party intentionally
distributed false information regarding the time, place, and manner of an election
or falsely described voter eligibility. A thorough statute should also contain
extraordinary penalties if the distribution was knowingly disseminated through
a political party affiliation, campaign, or candidate. In this instance, conspiracy

231 (1989)).
221. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
222. Burson, 504 U.S. at 197 (citation omitted).
223. Id. at 199 (citation omitted).
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principles should apply. Moreover, any voter suppression statute should contain
both a private right of action and civil and criminal penalties. In addition, if the
government opts to impose separate laws for voter deception, where the
misinformation included threats of incarceration or deportation, prosecutors
should also charge the perpetrators under applicable voter intimidation statutes. 224
A more focused voter deception statute need not include a requirement of
racial or purposeful discrimination. It should, however, include accelerated
penalties for evidence that the illegal practice targeted a particular racial, ethnic,
or language group. It is much more difficult to prove that an act of violence was
precipitated with thoughts of racial animus or hatred than proving that an
individual knowingly disseminate false information related to the voting process.
If a purposeful component is required, most perpetrators would argue that the
distribution was based on political affiliation instead of racial identity.225 The
mere act ofpurposefully distributing false information should satisfy any statute.
The government should implement a tiered system to ensure that penalties will
deter deceptive practices.

A. A Proactive Approach
Any attempt at fashioning anti-voter deception legislation must include a
proactive approach to addressing and correcting the misinformation. The
government's approach must contain both proactive and reactive components to
ensure that citizens' ability to participate in the political process is not
diminished. Although it has not traditionally served in the capacity as educator,
in the deceptive practices context, governmental agencies must correct
misinformation in a timely manner in order to limit its impact on the affected
community.
Currently, no statute or administrative regulation requires the government to
provide corrective information. Such a requirement would constitute a proactive
approach to governing and election administration. In comparison to regulation
and protection in areas such as food and product safety, the government allows
voter deception to linger unanswered. The federal government transmits
information on food safety and product liability to curb the harm to the general
public,226 and the same should occur for the fundamental act of voting. When

224. The federal government could utilize 42 U.S.C. 1971(b)(2006) or 18 U.S.C. 594 (2006).
See supra notes 97 -97, 102 and accompanying text. States can utilize their broadly written statutes
that contain an intent component as well as the presence of threats in the absence of specific
legislation. See supra Part II.
225. This type of response has been raised in redistricting cases. See e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft,
539 U.S. 461,469-70 (2003) (involving state legislators attempting to reapportion partisan districts
and increase minority voting strength).
226. See generally U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm., Recalls and Product Safety News,
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prereUprerel.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). If the federal
government can employ a process for notifying citizens of problems with food, toys and other
consumer products, it can develop a similar notification process for voter suppression and
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voter suppression occurs, the federal or state government, or both, should have
a central office that receives such information at the state and federal levels and
provides corrected information to the public, especially the affected community.
Some states have already seen it as their responsibility to correct misinformation
about the time, place, and manner of elections. 227 The federal government should
use websites, toll-free numbers, press releases, and other means to address
deceptive voter practices. Additionally, federal agencies have been slow to
respond to false voter information. The government should utilize state agencies
and local media to develop public service announcements that warn of the
distribution of false election information in the locale and provide the correct
information to insure that the democratic process is not contaminated.
Moreover, the federal government has the components necessary to engage
in a regular voter education program through the use of existing laws. For
example, the NVRA228 requires designated agencies,229 such as the Department
of Motor Vehicles, social services agencies, libraries, and others, to ask clients
if they would like to register to vote.230 But registering is merely the first
important step in realizing one's electoral potential. The federal government
must take the next step and require those agencies designated under the NVRA
to provide basic voter education information through signage and state-generated
brochures.23I States should also require designated agencies to provide clients

correcting and exposing misinformation.
227. See Donna Marie Owens, Election Officials Vigilant Over Voter Intimidation,
Suppression, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.publicbroadcasting.netlwesmlnews.newsmainlarticle/
0101 1398250IWESM.LocaIRegional.NewslElection.Officals.Vigilant. Over. Voter.Intimidation.S
uppression (Maryland Attorney General Doug Gansler announced that citizens in predominately
African-American neighborhoods had received flyers that said, "If you owe back child support or
you owe parking tickets or you're an immigrant, you may be arrested, if you come to vote on
Election Day."); see also MD. Arr'y GEN. OFF., REpORT ON THE ArrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE ON VOTING IRREGULARITIES (2008), http://www.oag.state.md.uslReportsIVotingTaskF orce
Repor4_28.pd£
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-1 (2006); see also supra note 8.
229. Id. § 1973gg-5 (requiring that "[e]ach state shall designate agencies" where voters can
register to vote and allowing the state to include "public libraries, public schools, offices of city and
county clerks (including marriage license bureaus), fishing and hunting license bureaus, government
revenue offices, unemployment compensation offices, and offices not described in paragraph (2)(B)
that provide services to persons with disabilities" to be places where people can register to vote).
230. See supra note 7. The NVRA has met much criticism as an under-utilized statute. Critics
have also argued that the Department of Justice-the statute's primary enforcer-has in past
administrations left many portions of the Act unenforced and thus has left thousands of citizens
unregistered. See, e.g., Steve Carbo et ai., Ten Years Later: A Promise Unfulfilled; The National
Voter Registration Act in Public Assistance Agencies, 1995-2005, DEMOS, July 2005 (Nonprofit
advocacy groups Demos, ACORN, and Project Vote found that most public assistance agencies did
not incorporate voter registration into their services as the NVRA requires.).
231. The proposed legislation proposed in this Article would also require state election
agencies to supply NVRA-designated agencies with various information regarding the time, place
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with information from the state's election official regarding primary and general
election dates, as well as where to find additional information about the proper
polling place.
Much misinformation centers on citizens receiving information containing
the wrong date for an election. Each NVRA-designated agency and other
election-related agencies could advertise primary and general election day
information. They could also provide citizens with clear information about the
methods of voting, i.e., absentee, early voting, election day procedures, and
provisional ballots, which directly prevent and address deceptive practices as
well as promote public participation and confidence. Accordingly, the
government should encourage and inform its citizens about election day
occurrences and dispel any myths prior to the election relating to eligibility, time,
place, and manner requirements for casting a ballot. Once the government
receives a credible report regarding the distribution of false information, it must
act expeditiously to correct that information.

B. Private Right ofAction
Any legislation that addresses deceptive acts must include a private right of
action. Wronged individuals or groups should have the ability to pursue legal
action in order to deter future occurrences. In most other contexts, such as
product liability or food safety, the consumer is allowed to pursue legal action
against a manufacturer or producer. 232 The federal government has created the
Consumer Protection Agency, which is responsible for protecting consumers
from, inter alia, false advertising, and faulty products. In the voting context,
citizens currently do not have an opportunity to litigate wrongs perpetrated
against them for deceptive acts.
With this private right of action, the statute should also allow plaintiffs to
recover costs and attorney fees. A person who is dissuaded from voting via this
misinformation for fear that she is ineligible or believes the document originated
from a governmental agency has been defrauded of an opportunity to exercise the

and manner of voting. For example, Section 203 of the VRA requires covered jurisdictions to
provide all election-related materials in languages covered under Section 203. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aaI a(b) 2006). States must provide identical information in both English and the covered language,
e.g., Spanish or Hmong. Id. Here, as opposed to providing that information only at the voter
registrar or other election-related office, the information would also disseminate to social services
agencies. As with Section 203, the state governments should also provide a toll-free hotline to
report deceptive acts. Once the state receives and verifies the information and finds it credible, it
must begin to broadcast corrected information. Additionally, any signage or brochures must
include websites including appropriate contact information where citizens can report deceptive acts
and provide copies of deceptive documents.
232. See IND. CODE § 34-20-2-1 (2008); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.2947 (West 2009);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (West 2009); see also In re BridgestoneiFirestone, Inc., 288 F.3d
1012 (7th Cir. 2002); In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689 (N.D. Ga.
2008); Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988).
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fundamental right to participate in the democratic process and should have the
ability to pursue legal actions against the responsible individuals.

C. Criminal and Civil Penalties
Disseminating information to a protected racial group with the intent to
suppress votes is an overt act of discrimination, and governments should penalize
those who disseminate this information with criminal and civil penalties.233
Various federal statutes empower the government to seek modest penalties
against persons who intimidate voters. 234 Advocates realized the weakness of

233. Jordan T. Stringer, Comment, Criminalizing Voter Suppression: The Necessity of
Restoring Legitimacy in Federal Elections and Reversing Disillusionment in Minority
Communities, 57 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1042, 1047-48 (2008) (offering the following suggestions to
deter voter suppression: 1) "the use of phone harassment legislation should continue as an
innovative prosecutorial" technique, 2) "prosecutors should extend" the technique to "robo-calls,"
3) "Congress should amend mailfraud legislation" to include mailings that "defrauds someone of
his or her right to vote," 4) "Congress should [pass] the legislation [proposed by] Senators Schumer
and Obama," and 5) Congress "should resolve the conflicting perspectives of voter access and voter
security in the name of electoral integrity and constitutional fidelity."); see also Pardo, supra note
78, at 329-30 (discussing election fraud and arguing for use ofthe Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(2006), which is used to prosecute offenders whose conspiracies require interstate travel, and the
Mail Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), which is used when mail fraud is involved in election
fraud or intimidation schemes); Rothschild & Wolinsky, supra note 101.
234. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (2006) (empowering the Attorney General to bring a civil
action to prevent or enjoin the activity and noting that "the Attorney General may institute for the
United States, or in the name of the United States, a civil action or other proper proceeding for
preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order, or other order"); supra Part I.A.2. 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(a) allows the Attorney General to bring
a civil action and seek up to $5,000 and impose five-year prison sentence.
Id. § 1973j(d) provides,
Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable grounds to believe that any
person is about to engage in any act or practice prohibited by section 1973, 1973a,
1973b, 1973c, 1973e, 1973h, 1973i, or subsection (b) of this section, the Attorney
General may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United States, an
action for preventive relief, including an application for a temporary or permanent
injunction, restraining order, or other order ....
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 594 (2006) imposes a fine or one year of prison upon persons who intimidate,
threaten or coerce persons from exercising the right to vote. Section 594 provides:
Whoever intimidates, threatens, coerces, or attempts to intimidate, threaten, or coerce,
any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to
vote or to vote as he may choose ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than one year, or both.
See Rothschild & Wolinsky, supra note 101, at 393-427 (providing an exhaustive list of applicable
civil, criminal and administrative laws that the federal government has available to combat voter
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Section 11 (b) and argued for strengthening the VRA, and specifically suggested
that Congress strengthen its voter intimidation laws. 235 They expressly suggested
that persons who engaged in harassment or intimidation of minority voters should
face criminal sanctions and that Congress should provide a private right of action
for individuals who have suffered from this illegal intimidation. They also
suggested that the injured individuals should be eligible to receive injunctive
relief, statutory damages, and attorneys' fees. 236 After reauthorization of the
VRA in 2007, Congress did not address this issue.237 Conversely, the NVRA
includes a private right of action, but most litigation pertaining to this statute has
included other voter access-related issues, such as the state's unwillingness or
inability to comply with its voter registration requirements. 238 None of the
litigation involved voter intimidation or voter deception.
The ObamaiSchumer bill would have increased monetary penalties from
$5,000 to $100,000 and would have increased possible prison time from one year
to five years. 239 These types of increases would make the statute meaningful and
would hopefully exhibit the seriousness associated with the actions.
Additionally, ifthe government seeks to criminalize deception, it should also
strengthen civil penalties. The existing penalties could serve as a deterrent for
individuals. When groups engage in deceptive practices, e.g., the Republican
Party in the Jesse Helms example,240 statutes must impose stricter penalties. If
prosecutors can link deceptive actions to a political campaign, such as the 2006
example of Prince George's County, Maryland,241 it should consider escalating
penalties, especially if it can demonstrate that the candidate or members of the
political party knew that the information contained intentionally false
information.
CONCLUSION

The establishment of the democratic form of government and the framers'
view of the importance of having the people voice their content or discontent
through the ballot have sustained much debate and controversy. Deceptive
practices undermine a citizen's right to participate freely in the democratic

intimidation and other election law violations).
235. See VERNON FRANCIS ET AL., LAWYER'S COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW,
PRESERVING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: REAUTHORIZATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2003),
http://faculty.washington.edulmbarreto/coursesNoting_Rights.pdf
236. Id. at 14.
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
238. See Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (9th Cir. I 995)(action trying
to enjoin California from failing to comply with NVRA); Ass'n ofCmty. Org. for Reform Now v.
Edgar, 880 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (private action brought against Illinois for failure to
comply with provisions ofNVRA).
239. Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Act, S. 453, I lOth Congo § 3 (2007).
240. See supra notes 123-24.
241. See supra Part I.A.
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process. When the right to vote is stolen via fraudulent, intimidating, or
deceptive acts, not only are the particular voter or group of citizens
disenfranchised, but their confidence in the democratic process is also
undermined. The pervasive inability or disinterest in prosecuting these acts leads
the perpetrators to believe that their actions can continue without penalty and
regard for their injury to democracy.
This right to participate embodies the essence of the democratic voting
process. When this access is thwarted by connivery, deception, intimidation, or
fraud, the fabric of the nation begins to unravel. Securing the threads of our
democratic fabric, through enforcement of constitutional rights and statutory
protections, tightens the bonds of freedom and protects the confidence and access
that citizens need and require to participate free from deceptive practices.
Governmental entities should wrap themselves in the protections afforded under
various constitutional provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause, to
protect its citizens from these acts. Where Congress lacks the willingness to
pursue such acts, the affected citizenry should have the opportunity to pursue a
private right of action in an effort to preserve the legitimacy of the democratic
process.

